Response to Walter Russell Mead's Blog Post "Georgia in the Crosshairs"

On October 28, 2010, the post entitled "Georgia in the Crosshairs" appeared on the blog of prominent American historian Walter Russell Mead [photo on the right courtesy of Pew Research Center website] at the website of The American Interest magazine. Apparently Mead recently traveled to Georgia, where he read lectures and had meetings in academic and government circles. Mead's previous blog posts on Georgia you can find here and here. Here is my response to Mead, which was also posted on his blog:

This post proves and exemplifies the frequent fallacy committed by Western social scientists with pompous academic credentials, who think they can become experts on Georgia and the Transcaucasus region after just one or two visits. The American nationalist, revisionist historian Walter Russell Mead is no exception to this rule. Of course, it would have been much better for him to stick to what he knows how to distort and embellish the best – namely the history of Anglo-American accomplishments. But academic figures of his stature are often characterized by such oversized egos that they are sure that their reputation is unassailable. The response below only partly aims to dispel this egotistical self-perception. It is largely intended to rebut some of Mead’s most ostentatious claims and factually incorrect observations.

In Mead’s highly amateur hodgepodge of facts, myths, truths, half-truths, unexamined assumptions and sweeping generalizations disguised as an authoritative crash course on Georgia, particular emphasis is placed on the incompetence, unpredictability and impulsiveness of the Georgian ruling elite as personified by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili. To recap Mead’s argument – bad decisions by the Georgian government produced “trust deficit” in European capitals and Washington and now Tbilisi is destined to linger in the dangerous geopolitical limbo, wherein it has no choice but to exercise “strategic patience” and to conduct modest foreign policy entirely subservient to American interests in the Caucasus region and vis-à-vis Russia. This, Mead argues, will hopefully, at some indefinite point, lead to closer relationship (but no membership) with European Union and perhaps better chances (but highly unlikely) at being considered for NATO membership. What a bright perspective indeed.

First of all, since the August 2008 war blaming all of Georgia’s misfortunes on the Georgian government has become a favorite pastime of many European and some American analysts, observers, experts as well as government officials. Pointing out real and perceived drawbacks of the Georgian decision makers in reality masks the inability and unwillingness of the American and European political establishment to do anything about Russia’s aggressive policy towards those post-Soviet countries that lean in the Western direction. Growing strategic dependence on Russia in Afghanistan further complicates and actually precludes any meaningful Western response in this regard. The result of this sad state of affairs has been the marked increase of Russian influence across the post-Soviet space.

Ukraine is the best case in point because anyone, who is even remotely familiar with current developments in that important country, has plenty to worry about because the Kremlin-friendly government of President Viktor Yanukovich has been systematically eroding the democratic achievements of the Orange Revolution. Moreover, following direct orders from Moscow Yanukovich now began to develop relations with world’s rogue authoritarian leaders as evidenced by the recent visit to Kyiv by the virulently anti-American leader of Venezuela Hugo Chavez.

In Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, the contours of the unequal and awkward Russo-American geopolitical condominium are beginning to materialize. Regardless of flowering rhetoric of official pronouncements, statements and speeches to the contrary, at the center of the American approach (because reactive positioning cannot be called policy) to Kyrgyzstan remains the uninterrupted operation of the Manas Transit Center. However, it is an open secret that the Kremlin exerts significant influence over Kyrgyz political circles and any decision on Manas will be taken only with Moscow’s approval. The success of the parliamentary model in Kyrgyzstan, which is espoused by the Obama administration, is far from assured considering Russian determination to keep American influence there checked at all times.

This brings us to Georgia. It is clear that in the context of the Obama administration’s “reset” policy with Russia, Georgia has become an inconvenient ally. The current U.S. approach to Georgia is predicated on the repetition of the familiar mantra of respect to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which does not really oblige Washington to do anything to change the untenable status quo there. This approach can be otherwise crudely summed up in a pithy American expression – words don’t cost a thing.

To be sure, in exchange for the generous diplomatic and financial support from Washington, Tbilisi, as a stalwart American ally, does what it can. Georgia’s contribution to the fledgling mission in Afghanistan is certainly appreciated by the U.S. and NATO officials, but apparently disregarded by Mead, who never mentions it in his meandering screed. Similarly the close bilateral cooperation in the counter-proliferation area that yielded the arrest and transfer to the United States of Amir Hossein Ardebili, one of the key Iranian arms dealers responsible for procurement abroad of weapons and dual-use items for Iranian armed forces, also somehow escaped Mead’s attention. It should be noted here that the Iranian government exerted significant pressure on Georgia to release Ardebili, but Tbilisi refused and risked angering Tehran. As a matter of fact, this individual was of such importance to Tehran’s clerical regime that during the official visit to Iran last year the Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze reportedly apologized to the Iranians for the Ardebili affair. Perhaps Mead would learn a thing or two by reading the most comprehensive and richly detailed account of the Operation Shakespeare, which was compiled by the investigative reporter John Shiffman and published in the Philadelphia Inquirer in September.

Second, with no apparent knowledge of the developments preceding the August 2008 war Mead asserts that Georgia pursued “reckless and aggressive policies toward Russia in the summer of 2008.” Had he read the relevant parts of the report prepared by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (more frequently referred to as simply Tagliavini Report for the name of the Swiss diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, who chaired the mission), he would have known that the Russian-Georgian war was preceded by the pattern of escalating tensions in which the Georgian-populated villages in South Ossetia were subjected to the increasing small arms fire and shelling by the South Ossetian separatist paramilitary forces.

Moreover, in the unlikely chance Mead would want to venture to examine the events that transpired in the spring of 2008, he will discover that with some support from Germany and active participation and mediation of the then Georgian Ambassador to UN, Irakli Alasania, the Georgian side approached the Abkhaz with the proposition that envisioned the partition of the territory of Abkhazia in return for the recognition of its independence. However, due to the pressure from Russia the Abkhaz rejected the partition proposal, which envisioned the reintegration of the Georgian-populated Gali region into Georgia in exchange for Tbilisi’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence.

With regard to the warnings from the Bush administration not to antagonize Russia, Mead ought to consider the official visit to Georgia by the then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July of 2008, less than a month before the beginning of hostilities in South Ossetia. Just as the Georgian airspace was being violated by the Russian aircraft, Secretary Rice casually assured the Georgian President: “We always fight for our friends.” In hindsight not the best choice of words given the extremely charged atmosphere on the eve of the conflict in which misperceptions and misinterpretations could have happened easily. In general, the deliberations on the American side prior, during and after the August war are meticulously described by Ronald Asmus in his seminal study A Little War that Shook the World.

Third, Mead expresses concern over the Georgian government’s decision to introduce the visa-free regime for the residents of the North Caucasus partly because he is concerned for the safety of the American expats living and working in Georgia and partly because such a move would irritate Russians. What Mead fails to realize is that the aforementioned decision serves Georgia’s long-term national interests in that volatile region. The best way to promote people-to-people interaction is to have a visa-free regime. The improvement of relations with the North Caucasian neighbors, over time, will have a positive impact on Georgia’s image among them. Developing good neighborly relations with the North Caucasian republics is of utmost importance to Georgia. Tbilisi remembers all too well what the neglect of this region produced in the early 1990s when, on the wave of separatist conflicts in Georgia, the North Caucasus region was permeated by the anti-Georgian sentiments. In presuming that all North Caucasians willing to take advantage of the visa-free regime are rebels or are somehow connected to them Mead commits another ignorant mistake, which actually borders on ethnic prejudice, the kind that is popular in certain Russian circles.

Fourth, by the time the doors of NATO may finally open for Georgia in accordance with the Bucharest summit commitments, the alliance may cease to exist altogether. Mead would hopefully benefit from reading about NATO’s inconsistent enlargement policy, diminished internal cohesion and inadequate military spending in this article.

The problems within NATO are manifest and they go beyond the apt typology of “Old” vs. “New” Europe introduced by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, they are perhaps the most painfully manifested in disagreements over Afghanistan and mandatory defense expenditures. Another area of constant tensions within the alliance is represented by the topic of contingency planning. For many representatives of “New” Europe in the alliance, who began to feel uneasy over Article V (collective defense) in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war this issue became extremely important. The Baltic States in particular felt defenseless and they insisted and belatedly received some assurance in the form of military exercises, which were most recently held in Latvia last month. Similar concern by Poland had to be allayed by the deployment of the Patriot missile battery and limited U.S. contingent there, which serves very little military purpose, but has tremendous political and symbolic significance.

Irrespective of what will be decided at the approaching Lisbon summit, in the context of the global economic crisis some NATO member-states intend to significantly reduce their military expenditures as part of the austerity measures. The recently brokered Anglo-French defense agreements are basically creative cost-cutting mechanisms, which make sense between the two highly compatible military force structures. However, it is easy to see in the medium- to long-run that unsustainable social welfare systems of European NATO members will invariably lead to more defense cuts to the detriment of the alliance. Therefore, while searching for external security guarantees will remain a top priority for Georgia, NATO may not be the only available option.

Finally, perhaps the only thing about which Mead is right is in pointing out that the Georgians should learn to be far more circumspect with regard to voicing their preferences between the Democratic or Republican parties. The Democratic Party has a long memory and in many ways the current Georgian government is still wrongly viewed by many party insiders and heavyweights as the neoconservative experiment closely associated with the Bush administration and its democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space. Overcoming this bias will not be easy, but it is not impossible. Georgians are not that beholden to illusions as it may seem at first glance by Mead. Many centuries of survival against the overwhelming odds taught them to be pragmatic and to balance the interests of other, more powerful players. Most recent confirmation of the latter was the official visit to Tbilisi by the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki this past Wednesday.

To Mead there is only this left to say – thanks for nothing. Your demagogic admonition to Georgia, its people and its leaders can be summed up in the following funny and bitter title of the article, which appeared on August 25, 2008 in the popular American satirical magazine The Onion: “U.S. Advises Allies Not To Border Russia.” Such advice is not worth a dime and you ought to keep it to yourself.

Georgia's New Threat Assessment Document Identifies Russia as a Main Threat

NOTE: This article was published in the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor today.

On September 2, 2010, the Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, signed Order No.707, which approved the adoption of the Georgia’s Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013. In accordance with Article 61 of Georgia’s General Administrative Code, the aforementioned document replaced the previous Threat Assessment Document for 2007-2009, which was adopted by the Presidential Order No.542 on September 24, 2007. The examination of the unclassified 7-page portion of the new threat assessment document provides unique insights into the global, regional and local threat perception of the current Georgian government.

According to the Preamble, “the Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013 [hereafter referred to as TDA] represents the fundamental conceptual document that identifies the threats facing Georgia and analyzes the scenarios of their possible development, their likelihoods and results.

TDA is based on the broad understanding of security that entails not only the assessment of the military-political threats but also of the socio-economic and terrorist threats as well as natural and technogenic catastrophes. The understanding of the aforementioned threats is necessary for the proper execution of government policy aimed at neutralizing the threats facing Georgia."

TDA is divided into the following five parts: I. Military threats, II. Foreign policy threats, III. Transnational threats, IV. Socio-economic threats, and V. Natural and technogenic threats and challenges.

The first part –Military threats– opens with the doctrinal statement that rules out the conduct of foreign affairs based on the politics of force as “posing a threat to the fundamental principles and norms of the global community.” Furthermore, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and subsequent Russian occupation of Georgia’s breakaway regions “made it clear that for the sake of its narrow interests the Russian Federation is willing to openly confront the fundamental principles and norms of international law, which represent the cornerstone of contemporary international relations.” It follows then that Russia’s continued occupation of the separatist territories “poses a direct threat to Georgia’s sovereignty, statehood and represents the most important factor of political, economic and social destabilization.” Therefore, “failure to comply with the international obligations of the ceasefire agreement by the Russian Federation, absence of international peacekeeping forces in the occupied territories, and the increasing militarization of the occupied territories increase the risk of provocations and create a possibility of new military aggression.”

The main aim of the policy of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis Georgia is “to disrupt the realization of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice and to compel Georgia by force to return to Russia’s orbit.” In this conceptual context the ultimate objective of the August 2008 military aggression “was not the occupation of Georgia’s territories or international recognition of the marionette regimes, but the removal of the pro-Western government of Georgia because the Russian ruling political elite considers independent and democratic Georgia a significant threat.” The failure to achieve that overarching objective and the unwillingness of the Russian ruling political elite to reconcile with the status quo “increase the expected threats and risks from Russia.”

The situation in the occupied territories is a significant source of risks. “The lawlessness dominating the occupied territories and the existence of illegally armed and criminal groups of the marionette regimes there negatively affect Georgia’s national security and increase the risk of provocations and incidents, especially in those areas immediately adjacent to the occupation line.”

Another important security challenge is represented by the existence of the conflict zones in Georgia’s neighboring countries. The possibility of spillover from those conflicts into Georgia represents a “challenge to Georgia’s national security” because “the transition of the regional conflicts to a more intensive phase and possible resumption of hostilities, along with other challenges, will cause a humanitarian crisis that will produce large refugee flows and will increase the danger that informal armed formations may enter the country along with the refugees.” Other harmful consequences of such developments also include “the increase in contraband and other types of transnational organized criminal activities” and “the deterioration of the regional security environment,” all of which “will threaten the transportation and energy projects existing in the Caucasus.”

The second part –Foreign policy threats– proclaims outright that the Russian Federation “spends significant resources in the international arena to carry out an anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” with the purpose of “derailing the transformation of Georgia into a state based on Western values.” Thus, the main objective of the aforementioned campaign is “to create the image of Georgia as a non-democratic and unstable state with aggressive aims.” TDA predicts that the Russian Federation “will continue an intensive and widespread anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” in order to “hinder Georgia’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.”

With the purpose of undermining Georgia’s statehood and territorial integrity the Russian government expends considerable political and financial resources on efforts aimed at achieving international recognition of the independence of Georgia’s occupied territories. TDA soberly admits that “despite the fact that the ‘independence’ of these regions was recognized only by Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru, the Russian government continues an active campaign on the international arena to legitimize the occupation of Georgia’s territories and to undermine the international legal status of Georgia’s sovereign territories by recognizing the marionette regimes.”

Equally noteworthy is the emphasis on “the demographic manipulations in the occupied territories,” which are recognized as “containing a threat to Georgia’s national security.” In particular, “the creation of supporting conditions for settling Russian citizens will extend the occupation and significantly complicate the de-occupation process.” In this regard, especially alarming “are those legal steps that are currently taken by the marionette regimes to give residence and private property rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the citizens of other countries” and “construction of so-called military settlements and reconstruction of military infrastructure that will encourage the arrival and settlement of the families of Russian military officials in the occupied territories.”

Georgian national interests are also threatened by the absence of international engagement in the occupied territories. Russia “expends exceptional efforts in order not to allow international engagement in the occupied territories, whereas it is precisely fully-fledged international engagement that represents a significant mechanism for achieving practical results in establishing security and stability in the occupied territories.”

The recap of the remaining parts of the TDA reveals that it is closely modeled on similar programmatic documents of Western countries and most importantly the National Security Strategy of the United States. Part III (Transnational threats) makes mention of the threats posed by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations and transnational criminal entities. This category of threats also includes cyber warfare. In this regard TDA notes that “during the August 2008 war the Russian Federation in parallel with land, air and sea attacks carried out concentrated and massive cyber assault on Georgia,” which demonstrated that “the use of computer technologies to carry out cyber attacks represents a real threat in the globalized world.” The lawlessness in the occupied territories represents another significant transnational security challenge. Among the types of criminal activity there “the illegal transit of components of weapons of mass destruction, illegal trade in weapons and narcotics, production and distribution of counterfeit currency, and human trafficking” pose particularly grave risks.

Finally, Part IV (Socio-economic threats) mainly discusses the threats to Georgia’s sustainable economic development posed by the global financial crisis, while Part V (Natural and technogenic threats and challenges) focuses on examining the ecologically dangerous developments in the occupied territories, challenges posed by Georgia’s location in the seismically active zone and such technogenic risks as chemical spills, accidents at hydroelectric power facilities, and emergencies on main pipelines.

Is Part of the Georgian Opposition Financed by Georgian Organized Crime?

NOTE: The following article was published in the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor (EDM) on June 30, 2010 (Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 126). This version of the article is enhanced with direct hyperlinks embedded in the text, which, due to the EDM format limitations, could not be incorporated in the original:

On June 22, the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau published an article by Andreas Förster entitled “Georgian Mafia Planned a Coup,” in which it was stated that part of the Georgian political opposition received funds from Georgian organized crime networks in Europe to foment unrest in Georgia with the aim of toppling the government of Mikheil Saakashvili. Förster’s main claim was that the street protests and four months-long occupation of downtown Tbilisi by the increasingly disorganized and unhinged opposition in the spring and early summer of last year were at least partly financed by the Georgian criminal groups operating in the EU. The article relied solely on the 66-page investigation report released recently by the Austrian Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt or BK).

Based on the transcripts of intercepted phone conversations between Georgian criminals residing in Germany and Austria, which were collected over the course of a year-long investigation that culminated in Operation Java in March, Austrian investigators concluded that the main objective of the pan-European Georgian criminal cartel, led by criminal authority and so-called “thief-in-law” Lasha Shushanashvili, was to destabilize the political situation in Georgia by providing support for violent demonstrations organized by the opposition. Furthermore, with the purpose of overthrowing the current Georgian government, President Mikheil Saakashvili and Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili in particular, the criminal organization attempted to collude with corrupt high-ranking officials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. However, the BK report makes no mention of the specific opposition groups that allegedly received funds from Georgian organized crime in Europe, which should not be surprising, considering the sensitive political nature of such allegations.

According to the BK report, the main liaison between Lasha Shushanashvili’s criminal organization and the Georgian opposition was the owner of a Georgian restaurant in Vienna. In an exclusive interview with the Georgian branch of Voice of America, a prominent German investigative journalist and expert on organized crime in Europe, Jürgen Roth, identified Rudiko Goguadze as the restaurant owner. Goguadze is a former prominent Mkhedrioni member whose extradition to Georgia in the late 1990s in connection with ordering the assassination of Georgian businessman and then-President Eduard Shevardnadze’s nephew, Nugzar Shevardnadze, was denied by the same Austrian government that also granted him political asylum. Roth stated that Goguadze played the role of chief intermediary, received money from Georgian organized criminal groups in Europe and sent it to their affiliates in Russia. From there, part of the funds were then sent to Georgia via the Moneytrans system of expedited wire transfers to finance an unknown segment of the Georgian opposition.

More importantly, the BK report states that Goguadze maintained a close personal connection with fugitive and former Minister of State Security of Georgia Igor Giorgadze, who has been residing in Moscow under the putative protection of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) since 1995, when he fled Georgia in the aftermath of the botched assassination attempt on Shevardnadze. Despite the Georgian government’s repeated extradition requests and the fact that Igor Giorgadze has long been placed on Interpol’s international wanted list, Moscow granted him political asylum in 2006 and continues to harbor him. (For more information on Igor Giorgadze’s involvement in Georgia’s politics, see here.)

Operation Java (see footage of detentions by the Spanish television here), which was carried out on March 15 simultaneously in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, France and Italy, struck a significant blow to Georgian organized crime in Europe (often mistakenly referred to in the European media as the “Russian mafia,” a common reference used to describe any type of organized criminal activity conducted by individuals from the post-Soviet space). Apart from Rudiko Goguadze, the Austrian police arrested other prominent Georgian criminal figures - Zaal Makharoblidze (aka Glekhovich) and Gocha Antipov (aka Alfason). Operation Java yielded more than 80 arrests, including 17 in Germany, 24 in Spain and 45 in Austria, France, Italy and Switzerland. Although in Barcelona the Spanish police arrested Lasha Shushanashvili’s brother Kakhaber Shushanashvili (On the right on the photo above. On the left is his accomplice and confidant Khvicha Pilia. Both were detained during the Operation Java in Spain. Photo courtesy of National Police of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Spain), who is thought to have controlled the so-called obshchiak, or collective funds, and directed criminal activities in other countries, the chief culprit Lasha Shushanashvili managed to escape in Greece. The chief Spanish anti-corruption prosecutor Antonio Salinas cited the lack of cooperation by Greek law enforcement authorities as the main reason for Lasha Shushanashvili’s escape. Throughout Operation Java, the Europol actively cooperated with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs and, as Roth stated, the Austrian Interior Minister Maria Fekter openly expressed her gratitude for her Georgian counterpart Vano Merabishvili's cooperation.

On June 24, Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze stated that the Georgian government was well aware of the contacts between the “marginal groups” within the opposition and Georgian criminal organizations based in Europe. Therefore there was nothing surprising in the BK report. Although speculations about the illicit connections between the individuals close to opposition circles and the Georgian mafia abroad circulated in the Georgian media before, the publication of the BK report marks the first time this clandestine interaction was identified by European law enforcement agencies.

The Article on the Atlantic Council's Website is Redacted after a Major Faux Pas

On Tuesday, June 8, 2010, the article entitled "Georgia Drifts Away from the West" by Matthew Czekaj, a research associate with the Atlantic Council's International Security Program, appeared on the New Atlanticist Policy and Analysis Blog of the Atlantic Council. It was an undoubtedly interesting read because it dealt with the uncomfortable subject of tensions in the U.S.-Georgian relationship, which are at least in part caused by Tbilisi's recent overtures towards Tehran. Particularly compelling was the following passage:

In an effort to extenuate the Georgian-Iranian partnership, Tbilisi was quick to declare that the relationship with Teheran would be strictly economic, and would not extend into closer political or foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Georgia claimed that it had personally discussed its strategy for Iran with the United States, and thus no one should be surprised by this partnership agreement. Yet, Tbilisi's assertions are highly dubious.

In fact, according to an Atlantic Council source in the National Security Council, the Georgians never approached the United States government regarding Iran. If they had, Saakashvili would not have so ecstatically endorsed the Turkish-Brazilian plan for reprocessing of Iranian nuclear fuel on May 18.

The highlighted portion above was especially intriguing because it directly suggested that some members of the Obama administration's hypertrophied National Security Council were definitely displeased by the Georgian government's initiatives vis-a-vis Iran. Several days later the article disappeared from the Atlantic Council's website altogether. Clicking the hyperlink only gave an automatic message saying that the page was missing. Then the article reappeared with the Editor's note, which states as follows: "This is an edited version of a previous copy of this article, which contained a factual error." The "edited" version of the passage above, which you can find here, reads as follows:

In an effort to extenuate the Georgian-Iranian partnership, Tbilisi was quick to declare that the relationship with Teheran would be strictly economic, and would not extend into closer political or foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Georgia claims that it has discussed its strategy for Iran with the United States, and thus no one should be surprised by this sudden outreach.

Yet, Saakashvili’s diplomacy seems very much out of step with the United States, having, endorsed the Turkish-Brazilian plan for reprocessing of Iranian nuclear fuel.

As can be clearly seen by the comparison of these two passages, the mention of the NSC source is omitted entirely. One can only surmise that apparently the mention of the NSC staff in such a sensitive context was deemed important enough to necessitate this redaction.

The Georgian Association Statement Regarding the Sale of the Mistral Helicopter Carrier to Russia

February 16, 2010

On Monday, February 8, 2010, Jacques de Lajugie, the head of international sales at the French Defense Ministry’s weapons production agency (Direction Générale pour l'Armement or DGA), confirmed that the French government agreed to sell Russia one Mistral-class advanced amphibious helicopter carrier and is considering a request for three more.

Possession of this state-of-the-art assault ship will significantly increase Russia’s force projection capabilities in the Baltic and the Black Seas, which will considerably undermine the security of the US and NATO allies in the region. Russia’s willingness to use the Mistral assault ship against Georgia is evident in the remarks of Admiral Vladimir Visotskiy, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, who in September of last year noted that possession of this warship during the war with Georgia in 2008 would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its military objectives in forty minutes. In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed the [Russian] Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore]” (Interfax, September 11, 15).

The Mistral sale marks the first time a NATO country has willingly transferred to Russia an advanced offensive weapons platform. This is alarming given that the Kremlin’s recently released national military doctrine explicitly states that NATO’s eastward expansion is the main external military threat to the Russian Federation. The French decision threatens NATO alliance solidarity and ignores Eastern European members, who have repeatedly warned against the Mistral sale.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, during his recent visit to Paris expressed Washington’s concerns over the Mistral sale to his French counterpart, Hervé Morin, but with little result. Unfortunately the interests of the French manufacturer, DCNS, based at the shipyards in Saint-Nazaire, prevailed over much more significant geopolitical considerations. This decision sets a precedent for other arms producers in Western Europe, who will now see Russia as a lucrative market for advanced naval military technology.

The Georgian Association in the United Sates, Inc. strongly protests the French government’s decision to transfer the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship to Russia and calls on the United States Government to use all its diplomatic power to halt the sale. The Georgian Association also calls on the US government for pro-active Eastern European/Black Sea/Caspian policy to increase security and boost the regional cooperation.

Sincerely,

The Georgian Association in the United States

THE GEORGIAN ASSOCIATION IS A NONPARTISAN NATIONWIDE MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION OF GEORGIAN-AMERICANS AND FRIENDS OF GEORGIA THAT ADVOCATES FOR GEORGIA AND GEORGIAN ISSUES IN THE U.S. IT IS THE OLDEST ORGANIZATION IN THE US REPRESENTING THE GEORGIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY

2300 M Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20037
Phone:(202)234-2441
Fax:(202)234-2441
www.GeorgianAssociation.org

The Cautionary Tale of Georgian Military Experience in Afghanistan

At the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers on Friday, December 4, and the so-called force generation conference held at the NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, on Monday, December 7, the Obama administration finally received the pledge of 7,000 additional troops from the NATO and non-NATO states to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for the stabilization of Afghanistan. This was almost immediately trumpeted by the Obama administration as a major achievement even though Canada and Netherlands are considering withdrawal of close to 5,000 of their combined troops from Afghanistan within the next two years while Germany and France both refused to provide additional troops at this point. Paris and Berlin may consider taking such steps only after the international conference scheduled for January 28 in London, which is supposed to review the progress of stabilization and state-building efforts in Afghanistan. In some sense, the Franco-German intransigence can be interpreted as a direct response to the prolonged deliberation by President Obama with regard to the formulation of the new strategy on Afghanistan. Be that as it may, it is worth noting that almost one seventh of the 7,000 pledge, or, to be more precise, 920 soldiers will be dispatched to Afghanistan by Georgia. The heavy battalion and two light companies of Georgian armed forces will serve under the U.S. Marine command in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan - the Helmand Province. As the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton observed, this is the highest per capita contribution to the NATO out-of-area operations in Afghanistan. It is intended to demonstrate that Georgia is a net security provider and can therefore one day become a valuable member of the alliance. However, as Georgia prepares to send its forces to Afghanistan to serve under the U.S. command, it would be instructive to recall the Georgian military experience in that country some three hundred years earlier, when the Georgian expeditionary force commanded by the King of Kartli Giorgi XI (see photo on the right courtesy of Wikipedia) was in the employ of the declining Safavid Empire. The following story is loosely based on the radio feature created by the Georgian writer and historian Mikha Gegeshidze and broadcast by the Georgian Service of the Voice of America. It is as timely as ever considering the current developments in Afghanistan.

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Once upon a time, a long time ago, where now the U.S. military have set up headquarters and the anti-terrorist campaign is under way, in the faraway city of Qandahar in Afghanistan, the King of Kartli, Giorgi XI held a court and governed local affairs. In the beginning of the XVIII century the weakened Iran was no longer able to deal with the continuous revolts by the rebellious Afghan tribes in the eastern provinces of the empire. Meanwhile in the separated by thousands of kilometers from Afghanistan Georgia, the kings of Kartli and Kakheti were engaged in the unequal struggle for independence from the same Persians. Because of this circumstance, the Shah’s Court in Isfahan hatched a treacherous plan to send Giorgi XI, who was known at the Court as Gurgin Khan or Gorgin Khan, from Georgia to Afghanistan to quell the unruly Pathan and Baluchi rebels. By dispatching the Georgian king and his troops renowned for their courage and martial valor, the increasingly corrupt and decadent administration of the Safavid ruler of Iran, Shah Soltan Hussein (alternative spelling: Soltan Hosayn), wanted to simultaneously diminish the threats of national liberation in Georgia and Afghanistan. With regard to this circumstance, the most loyal member of Giorgi XI retinue and the chronicler of his deeds, Sekhnia Chkheidze wrote:

“Thus, the Shah Soltan Hussein decreed to appoint King Giorgi to be spasalar [governor] of Kartli, Iran and Qandahar. What was to be derived from such a difficult task? Alas, with full intention to make the life in Kartli prosperous, we were unfortunately forced to leave for distant Qandahar with heavy hearts.”

In 1703, King Giorgi and his 24,000-strong combined Persian-Georgian troops entered Afghanistan and resolutely defeated the rebellious Pathan tribes. His forces captured the tribal chieftain of the Ghilzai rebels, Mirwais Khan Khottak, who was promptly sent to Isfahan. Giorgi XI sent a letter with the high-value prisoner in which he warned Shah Soltan Hussein that “this captive desires to sow mischief in Afghanistan and you’ll be better off if you never allow him to leave Isfahan, because otherwise he will turn against you again.” Giorgi XI also sent back to Isfahan the 20,000-strong Qizilbash forces and he was thus left with the small expeditionary detachment consisting only of Georgian cavalry. The Georgians were left to carry the heavy weight of the war with the Afghan tribes because the enemies of Giorgi XI in Isfahan convinced Shah Soltan Hussein to send Mirwais back to Afghanistan. Despite the tough weather conditions and the small number of troops, the Georgians confidently and bravely fought the Afghan rebels. Sekhnia Chkheidze, who himself was a skilled fighter, repeatedly notes in his chronicle that even in the midst of hardship Georgians often engaged in merrymaking to lift their morale and fighting spirit. This is what he has to say about Giorgi XI in this regard: “One of his peculiar habits was to become jolly when the matter at hand was often of the utmost importance and gravity. “

One of the Georgian commanders in Afghanistan, King's brother Prince Levan Batonishvili, recited the lines from Shota Rustaveli’s “Knight in the Panther’s Skin” to his troops before the battle. In the heat of the combat with the Baluchi fighters when the enemy bullets were whistling above Batonishvili’s head, Sekhnia Chkheidze pled with him to hide behind the horse to which Levan laughed and said that he was testing the fate. Encouraged by the bravery of their commanders, the Georgian cavalry troops were marching into the battle as if “by Almighty’s Grace, we were going to the wedding,” recalls Sekhnia Chkheidze. The tales of the exceptional martial valor of Georgians soon spread across the entire Afghanistan. This is how the citizens of the city of Kerman, who were long harassed and mistreated by the Pathans, expressed their gratitude to the Georgians: “Blessed be God for raising men like you, who saved us from peril.” Sekhnia Chkheidze describes with remarkable irony how the Georgian night guards applied creative intimidation techniques against their Pathan enemies the night before the battle:

“’God’s wrath is upon you! The Georgian Wali (Prince) Levan arrived with his man-eating Georgian troops!’ shouted the night guards and this caused a great anxiety among the Pathan ranks, but what they did not know was that we hardly had even twenty soldiers.”

The Persian troops, who were fighting together with the Georgians against the Pathan tribes, often exhibited fear and deserted the battlefield without looking back. Because of this circumstance the Georgians absorbed the entire viciousness of combat engagements in Afghanistan and they amply demonstrated feats of courage to their Pathan and Baluchi foes. Here is how Sekhnia Chkheidze describes one such encounter:

“Four Baluchi fighters rode off and the fifteen Persians rode after them. Then the four turned around and made the fifteen run back. When Zurab saw that, he went after the four. He struck one down with the spear and then the other. He struck the third Baluch so hard that, as sun shining above is the witness, the spear went straight through pinning him to the ground and it broke. Zurab then unleashed his sword against the fourth, who managed to get under his horse and tried to cut his stirrups with the dagger. But Zurab maneuvered his horse and when the Baluch’s head became visible he swung the sword and almost severed the head. The fifteen Persians then cut off the heads, congratulated Zurab and presented him with the four severed heads, but he declined to accept them and told them that he was simply assisting them.”

This case illustrates well the culture of knightly honor of the Georgian cavalrymen. The Georgians, noble and peasant alike, together experienced the vicissitudes of the deployment in Afghanistan, where they fought side by side. The cunning and treacherous supporters of Mirwais incurred the wrath of the Georgians, who resorted to the cruel punitive methods to quell the insurgency. Here is how Sekhnia Chkheidze describes some of the punitive methods employed:

“Wherever the signs of insurgency existed, the Georgian troops were dispatched in force and whomsoever they found among the rebels, some they threw into abyss and others were buried alive. Teeth were pulled out of some and hammered into their heads. The people of Qandahar became very afraid and they began to conspire against us.”

But Mirwais, who by then was defeated by Georgians on a number of occasions, in the end still managed to extract victory with his cunning. In 1709, he staged several rebellions in the villages close to Qandahar. Giorgi XI fell into this trap and sent 3,000-strong Georgian forces headed by his nephew Alexander to punish the rebels. Meanwhile Giorgi XI accepted the invitation by Mirwais to attend the lavish dinner in his honor. He went to the banquet with a small retinue of most loyal retainers. Here is what Sekhnia Chkheidze has to say about what happened next:

“The Sultan of Qandahar, Mirwais, betrayed the King Giorgi. At the dawn King Giorgi was suddenly attacked. He unsheathed his sword and managed to deflect most of the arrows that were raining on his tent. He fought like a beast, but was finally brought down by a rifle. And the rest of the Georgians were slaughtered without mercy.”

The enemies cited King Giorgi’s loyalty to Christianity as his biggest crime. As the Catholic missionaries in Iran note, and, according to Vakhushti Batonishvili, “the King was killed on Thursday and Mirwais discovered in King’s possession crosses, icons, and psalm books and presented them to Shah.” Mirwais sent 12,000-strong Pathan army against the remaining Georgian forces. “The Georgians fought them fiercely and they triumphed twelve times. The enemy lost 2,000 soldiers and, with Almighty’s Grace, the Georgians suffered no setbacks,” states the chronicle. After that, the Georgian military campaign in Afghanistan continued for some time and claimed the lives of many Georgian knights.

For their shameful betrayal of the Georgians fighting in Afghanistan, the Persians soon paid a very heavy price with their blood when the successors of Mirwais took over Isfahan and mercilessly exterminated the population of this once powerful imperial city. Among the Afghan warriors this proverb took deep roots - "Compared to Persians, we, Afghans, are lions, while Persians, compared to us, are mere sheep. But we are sheep, compared to Georgians, while Georgians are lions, compared to us."

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NOTA BENE: Not long after the assassination of Giorgi XI, in November of 1709, his nephew and a new King of Kartli Kaikhosro (alternative spellings: Kay Khusrau or Kai Khusraw) organized a punitive expedition to avenge the death of his uncle. He led the 30,000-strong Persian-Georgian army to lay siege to Qandahar, which did not last long as Kaikhosro's forces were constantly harassed by the Baluch fighters, who were trying to aid their besieged allies. In October 1711, Kaikhosro ordered the retreat, which turned into a disaster as the retreating troops were pursued by the Pathan forces. Kaikhosro was killed in battle and his entire army was reduced to 700 survivors.

Mirwais Khan Khottak properly assessed the decadence of the Safavids, but limited his actions to uniting the Pathan tribes and liberating Afghanistan from the foreign domination. His son, Mir Mahmud, who assumed power after the death of his father in 1715, however, turned out to be far more ambitious. The Afghan forces led by the 18-year-old Mahmud marched across Persia and struck into the very heart of the Safavid Empire - the city of Isfahan. Thus, in 1722, Mahmud effectively ended the Safavid rule once and for all. Ironically, Shah Soltan Hussein's failure to heed Giorgi XI's warning about the danger posed by Mirwais proved to be fatal as years later his son Mahmud spelled the demise of the entire Safavid Empire.

British Shadow Secretary of State for Defense Calls Russia a Threat

A week ago, on Tuesday, December 8, the Chatham House held the event "The Way Forward for NATO" featuring the British Shadow Secretary of State for Defense and Member of Parliament, Dr. Liam Fox (see photo on the right courtesy of www.liamfoxmp.co.uk), who delivered the speech on the future of the alliance. During the questions-and-answers session moderated by the Director of the Chatham House, Dr. Robin Niblett, Dr. Fox made a number of compelling remarks. Here are a couple of excerpts from the Q&A session, which can be streamed in its entirety (approximately half an hour) here:

On the geopolitical significance of globalization:

We do live in a very different global environment. I think that in many ways politicians have less grasp of globalization than the business community have. Politicians would like to talk about trade and prosperity, but they tend to focus much less on what is the unavoidable importation of strategic risk. If you have more widespread interests in more parts of the world, you are likely to be more threatened by more actors in more places. In many ways we are returning to a much more XIX century view of where we exist in the world rather than what may come to be seen as a blip of bipolarity of the XX century. And we'll have to re-learn some of the skills that we've had in dealing with that sort of global environment.


On Russia:

Tomas Valasek, Director of Foreign Policy and Defense at the Center for European Reform, who also advises Madeline Albright’s group of eminent personalities on the new NATO strategic concept, asked Dr. Liam Fox the following question:

Dr. Fox, thank you for your thoughtful remarks. One quick question on NATO-Russia. This is possibly the most divisive subject in the debates on the strategic concept so far. There are roughly three groups of allies if I might so stereotype them – those, who worry about Russia, particularly in Europe’s East and North and think of it as a possible future threat and want NATO to put in place preparations, contingency plans and exercises to prepare for the possibility; those, who do not think of Russia as a threat and think that concerns in Europe’s East and North are exaggerated; and those like Britain, if I might say so, and Canada, Denmark and others, who may be sympathetic to the concerns of those in Central Europe, but really think of Afghanistan as the right focus for NATO and possibly see in NATO paying more attention to Russia a distraction from NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Where would you stand on those issues? What sort of balance in your mind is required between the engagement of Russia and perhaps the reassurance of some of the allies against Russia and is reassurance indeed what NATO needs?

To which Fox responded:

I would add a fourth group, which is those, who really fear Russia, but pretend that they don’t, especially to Russia. They may be the biggest problem group that we have. I think Russia is a threat. Russia still targets weapons on us. Russia is still involved in the occupation of parts of Georgia. We’ve seen what happened in the Baltic States especially with the cyber attacks on Estonia. So let’s not pretend for a moment that Russia does not present us with the threat. It clearly does. But it also presents us with the opportunity. If we can find a way to deal with it in a constructive way, and I think what we need to do is to find language towards Russia, which is constructive, but strong and consistent. And I think the consistency is perhaps one of those things that we’ve lacked in our messaging and policy towards Russia in recent decades. So I think we have to find that. And I think…you know, in a rational world Russia would actually have a strong working relationship with the NATO alliance, with the West because we face many of the same problems of wider security, potential future threats of Islamist extremism Russia has on the southern border, of potential for nuclear proliferation, which we face in Iran, or wider issues of energy. But we do not live in a rational world and one of the problems in Russia is governance and the way Russia is governed and by whom makes a very big difference to Russia’s outlook. All we can try to do is to show Russia that we will be very strong in the defense of our borders, of those within our alliance, of our people and of our values, and ask them to work with us in areas where we have an overlap of common interests. And I think we need to go in without any preconditions, without overly optimistic views. And take a pragmatic and practical view to our relationships and establish confidence as far as we can along the way, but without fooling ourselves that we are entering some new golden era.

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NOTE: It appears that Dr. Fox's remarks caused some concern among unnamed Russian sources, as reported by the British website politics.co.uk.