In a Reversal, Obama Administration Pressures Georgia on Russia's WTO Accession

Despite the repeated public statements underscoring the Obama administration's commitment to the principle of non-interference in the on-going Russian-Georgian negotiations regarding Russia's WTO accession, it turns out that Washington tried to pressure Tbilisi at least on one occasion quite recently.

The Cable writes that, according to "a senior GOP Senate aide," U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk [see photo on the right courtesy of LegalInfo360.com], "while briefing senators before a recent congressional trip that included a stop in Georgia, asked those senators to pressure Georgia to move toward acceptance of Russia's membership in the WTO." Moreover, according to the aforementioned senior aide, "It was odd to hear Ambassador Kirk behind closed doors urging a group of senators to pressure Georgia to 'be reasonable' while, we understood, the administration was saying publicly it would stay out of a Georgia-Russia issue."

Survey of the relevant news reports in the Georgian media over the past couple of months allows one to conclude that the group of senators briefed by Ambassador Kirk included Republican senators Jon Kyl, Mike Crapo, Ron Johnson, and Jeff Sessions. According to Civil.ge, the U.S. senators met with the Georgian government officials in Tbilisi on April 18, as part of their five-country tour, which also included Ukraine and three Baltic states.

It should be recalled that previously the Obama administration officials emphatically insisted that they have no intention of mediating the Russian-Georgian talks or forcing the Georgian side to achieve the agreement with Russians. In early March, the Senior Director for Russia at the National Security Council, Michael McFaul, who has been recently nominated to become the next U.S. Ambassador to Russia, told The Cable: "There are definitely issues remaining between Russia and Georgia regarding trade relations that have to be addressed. There is a process underway. I don't want to prejudge it because we're not involved in it." Furthermore, according to The Cable: "McFaul was firm that the United States would not insert itself into the effort to help Russia and Georgia come to an agreement on the issue. 'We're not going to do that,' he said. At the end of the day this is a bilateral issue, not a trilateral issue.'"

Similar sentiments were expressed by another senior administration official to The Cable in late October of last year: "This is a bilateral issue between Russia and Georgia, this is not a trilateral issue that we are supposed to solve somehow." The same senior administration official clarified that the Obama administration had no intention of exerting influence on Georgia on this issue and that Washington would not offer incentives or disincentives to Tbilisi.

However, the news coverage accompanying the meeting of U.S. and Russian presidents on the sidelines of the G8 summit in France on May 26 suddenly revealed completely different picture. Not only much of the meeting was devoted to the discussion of the Russia's WTO accession, but also, according to a senior administration official, President Barack Obama has been personally engaged with this issue for months. In particular, the official told the ABC News that apparently President Obama came up with the idea of Switzerland acting as an honest broker between Russia and Georgia with regard to Russia's WTO accession-related negotiations. It turns out that President Obama secured President Medvedev's agreement regarding Russia's participation in Swiss-mediated talks with Georgia in November on the sidelines of the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization in Yokohama, Japan, whereas President Saakashvili acquiesced at the NATO summit in Lisbon the same month.

The fact that the U.S. Trade Representative tried to convince some Republican senators to pressure the Georgian government to compromise with Russia suggests that the Obama administration reversed its position on this issue. Given the central importance of Russia's WTO accession for the continuation of the seemingly stalled "reset" policy, this reversal should not come as a surprise. It will remain to be seen what outcome this tacit pressure will produce.

Although the Georgian side is often falsely accused of politicizing the Swiss-brokered negotiations both in Russian and Western media, Tbilisi's demands have actually nothing to do with the insistence on the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia's demands remain unchanged and they include the fulfillment by the Russian side of the obligations included in the 2004 bilateral accession protocol and the resolution of the custom administration issues along the Russian-Georgian border. None of these are insurmountable. With the modicum of good will and some creativity they can be resolved in a manner acceptable to both parties. For instance, the customs regime on the Abkhazian and South Ossetian sections of the Russian-Georgian border can be administered by the third party on Georgia's behalf (view advocated by Damon Wilson, Director of the International Security Program at the Atlantic Council) akin to the arrangement currently in place on the de facto borders of Moldova's separatist enclave of Transdnistria, which is carried out by the European Union. However, considering the attitudes prevailing in the Kremlin at present it is probably highly unrealistic to expect any sign of flexibility from the Russians on these issues. Meanwhile the next round of the Swiss-mediated Russian-Georgian talks, which was originally scheduled to start on June 2, has been postponed for "technical reasons" at the request of the Swiss government.

Georgian Foreign Minister's Interview Sheds Light on Georgia's Negotiating Positions at the Geneva Talks

This past Friday, March 4, 2011, marked the conclusion of the fifteenth round of the multilateral negotiations in Geneva between the government delegations from Georgia, Russian Federation, European Union, and the United States, with the participation of the representatives of the separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As was widely expected, no progress has been achieved on the most important issues, including committing Russia to a non-use of force pledge and allowing international security mechanisms in the breakaway regions. In general, since the EU, OSCE and UN jointly initiated the talks two months after the Russian-Georgian war in October 2008, the Geneva negotiations have been characterized by continuous stalemate with occasional bouts of theatricality orchestrated by the Russian side with support from its Abkhazian and South Ossetian proxies, which usually amount to demonstrative walk-outs and other attempts to obstruct the fledgling process. Although devoid of any practical impact, the Geneva negotiations are important for the American and Western diplomatic establishment only for the sake of maintaining some sort of dialogue between the sides that otherwise have no other channels of diplomatic communication. [NOTE: At present Georgia and Russia have no diplomatic relations. Geneva talks is the only forum, where Russian and Georgian diplomats meet face to face.] In other words, it is a classic case of "negotiations for the sake of negotiations."

About a week before the fifteenth round of the Geneva talks, on Thursday, 24 February, 2011, the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze [photo on the right courtesy of tbilisiwebinfo.wordpress.com] gave an exclusive interview to the Russian Service of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in which he highlighted some of Tbilisi's negotiating positions. Here is the selected verbatim recap of Vashadze's answers to questions by the RFE/RL journalist Irina Lagunina:

Q: What will the official Tbilisi present at the fifteenth round?

A: You know, Georgia exhausted its limit of initiatives. The last that we did was that on November 23 of last year, the President of Georgia gave a speech at the European Parliament in which he took upon himself and on Georgia the legal obligation not to use the force against the occupation forces and occupation regimes. This was appropriately documented in the legal sense. We sent letters in which we confirmed that we undertook legal obligations to all international organizations, including those that are co-hosts of the Geneva negotiations, to European Union because European Union is a co-host of Geneva talks, to the President of the United States of America because the United States of America is a full-fledged participant in the Geneva talks. In other words, we documented our obligations appropriately.

Now it is time for the Russian side to act. They should take upon themselves the same obligation that they will not use force against Georgia. There are military plans for such a war. You know, there is an absolutely hysterical campaign aimed at the militarization of the occupied territories. In response to Georgia's November 23 initiative, Russia deployed in the occupied territories quite dangerous not only for Georgia but also for the entire region offensive weapons, including Uragan [Uragan 9K57 Multiple Launch Rocket System], Smerch [Smerch 9K58 Multiple Launch Rocket System], S-300 [S-300 Surface-to-Air Missile System], and Tochka U [OTP-21 Tochka U Mobile Tactical Ballistic Missile Launch System]. This last one, as you know, can be equipped not only with the conventional warhead, which is dreadful in and of itself because it is comprised of 50 cassette [cluster] bombs, but also with the nuclear warhead. Why would Russia need Tochka U in the South Caucasus is not quite clear at all.

Q: But Russia presents itself at the talks as the moderator and not as one of the parties to the conflict.

A: Irina, this is precisely why the negotiations are paralyzed. On the one hand, Georgia and the United States are asking, demanding, insisting, begging, convincing Russia so that it would look at things as they are. On the other hand, there is an attempt to play out a "groundhog's day," as with Afghanistan, as with the so-called socialist camp and other attributes of the 20th century. In other words, they put in front of us these clowns, these occupation regimes and then they tell us to talk to them. Although there were many attempts to talk with them since 1991, which is when the occupation of these regions of Georgia actually began. Russia categorically refuses to talk with Georgia, to recognize Georgia as a sovereign state, to recognize our territorial integrity, to recognize the legally and democratically elected government, and the legally and democratically elected President. At the last round of negotiations the talks ended at the fifteenth minute, when the delegations of Georgia and the United States demanded from Russia to undertake commitment not to use military force. That happened during the meeting of the first working group. In the second working group Russia declared that the refugees will never return to their places of residence and will never get back their houses.

Response to Oliver Bullough

On February 14, 2011, the Georgian news portal Georgiandaily.com published my response to Oliver Bullough [see photo on the right courtesy of circassianworld.com], whose article "Letter From Tbilisi: Toward a United Caucasus. A New Georgian Gamble in the Caucasus?" appeared on the website of the Foreign Affairs magazine on December 23, 2010. I am reposting it here in its entirety:

Response to Oliver Bullough

February 14, 2011

by Alexander Melikishvili, Freelance Research Analyst

Judging by the very appearance of Oliver Bullough’s vastly simplistic and transparently biased interpretation of Georgia’s recently launched array of policy initiatives vis-à-vis the North Caucasus (“Letter From Tbilisi: Toward a United Caucasus,” Foreign Affairs, December 23, 2010), the quality standards at the Foreign Affairs sadly continue to disappoint.

For many centuries now the volatile areas around the world have a habit of attracting rather diverse mix of thrill-seeking adventurers of all kinds and walks of life. In recent centuries this set of colorful characters ranged from Alexandre Dumas and Lev Nussimbaum to Sir John Chardin and Odette Keun. Of course, mentioning Bullough in this company is undoubtedly giving him too much credit, but these are difficult times that probably merit certain leniency as well as charity.

Bored with the Welsh Marches, in comes this self-styled “Rory Stewart” of the Caucasus, who is clearly convinced that he is qualified not only to admonish the Georgian government for its “provocative and potentially destabilizing” overtures towards the North Caucasus but also to urge the West and more specifically the Obama administration to do something about it. Curious indeed. However, let us proceed in examining the most problematic aspects of his essay in an orderly manner.

The reiteration of fallacies should begin with the often heard Russian complaint of Georgia’s alleged “betrayal” of its former imperial master. Apparently Bullough is highly susceptible to the Russian interpretation of the historical events, including the fateful signing of the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783, which is conveniently presented as the selfless, humane and noble deed and not as anchoring of imperial ambitions and interests in the Caucasus that lasted in one form or another to the present day.

Bullough is obviously unaware of the fact that the Russian Empire subsequently violated the terms of the aforementioned treaty by disrupting the Georgian monarchic line, co-opting the oversized and fractious Georgian aristocracy and systematically destroying any vestiges of Georgian sovereignty symbolic or otherwise. In other words, Georgia became another territorial acquisition in the seemingly relentless expansion of the Russian Empire by land. Paradoxically by then Georgian statehood withstood multiple Muslim yokes and yet it was the “fellow Christians” from the north, who put an end to it. Under the Russian imperial rule Georgians distinguished themselves by serving Tsars with erstwhile zeal and exceptional loyalty. The equestrian statue of Georgian Prince and General of Russian Army Pyotr Bagration(i) that still stands in downtown Moscow ought to be an adequate reminder of this service. However, the collapse of the Russian Empire drastically changed the geopolitical circumstances surrounding Georgia and if it were not for the Bolshevik reoccupation and subsequent seven decades of servitude under the Soviet rule who knows where Georgia’s westward reorientation would have led? Bullough simply fails to comprehend that Georgia’s yearning for Euro-Atlantic integration is not some sort of bizarre idée fixe of the current Georgian government but it reflects genuinely broad national consensus.

However, the weakest point of Bullough’s argument is in simplistically interpreting Georgian government’s decision to introduce a visa-free regime for the residents of the North Caucasus as yet another example of Tbilisi’s thoughtless poking of the Russian bear. As I already wrote elsewhere, in simplifying travel procedures for the North Caucasians Tbilisi primarily seeks to cultivate the good will towards Georgia among them. The same purpose is served by the growing educational exchanges as well as by the relaunch in January of the First Caucasus News television channel, which is run by the veteran British journalist Robert Parsons.

The mentioning of Georgian natural gas imports from Iran is clearly intended to fuel Western suspicions about Georgian government’s regional policy, as the Georgian analyst David Iberi aptly notes in his criticism of Bullough’s piece here. In his monumental ignorance Bullough fails to mention that Iran is, by far, not the most vital source of natural gas for Georgia. Georgia receives the bulk of its natural gas from the neighboring Azerbaijan. If he were to do some most basic fact-checking before writing his screed, Bullough would have also discovered that NATO member Turkey last year increased its gas imports from Iran by 50 percent.

What is also striking about Bullough’s piece is that the author completely neglects to mention the systematic manner in which the Russian government alienated the population of the North Caucasus. Amidst the rising xenophobia targeting the dark-skinned “people of Caucasian nationality” in Russia proper, the North Caucasians have long become the second class citizens of the Russian Federation. So much so that after the introduction of the visa-free travel to Georgia a joke took root among the North Caucasians that at least now the anachronistic propiska or record of place of residence stamped in the Russian passport finally offers distinct advantage of visa-free travel to Georgia as opposed to many disadvantages and discrimination that a holder of such passport would experience once he or she ventures into the Russia proper.

Another sign of intellectual dishonesty is evident in the omission of the conferral of the Russian citizenship en masse on the residents of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which violated the international law, as is duly noted in the EU-sponsored report on the August 2008 war.

In a typical zero-sum fashion Bullough makes rather provocative claim that any expansion of Georgia’s influence over the North Caucasus will invariably result in the weakening of Russia’s grip over this volatile region, which, he asserts, could result in ethnic conflicts there with all the consequences for the “outside powers.” What he forgets is that the Kremlin’s hold on the North Caucasus has always been rather tenuous. The policy of installing Putin loyalists and hoping that they will somehow manage the local affairs has proven to be disastrously misguided and ineffective. The widespread corruption, police brutality, rising unemployment and near total neglect from the federal center in Moscow created fertile conditions in which the insurgency that was once primarily circumscribed to Chechnya has now spread to the other North Caucasian republics. It is hard to imagine that Tbilisi’s peaceful “soft power” initiatives would make matters worse there and yet Bullough seems to be adamant about such doom and gloom scenarios. After the most recent attack on the Domodedovo Airport, Russians are more openly asking the questions about what they received in terms of basic security after more than ten years of Putinism.

Bullough contradicts himself when he grudgingly recognizes that Tbilisi is gradually restoring the status of the cultural and economic capital of the Caucasus region (both North and South) that it once held while at the same time resisting and even fearing this process.

Finally, Bullough naively overestimates the influence Washington now wields over Tbilisi. With the new round of Iran sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council and the new START treaty signed and ratified, the “reset” with Russia must now be propelled by Russia’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Here, however, Georgia suddenly finds itself in possession of a unique leverage because the WTO membership can only be granted by the unanimous consent of all member-states. Georgia is a WTO member and for a number of legitimate reasons, including the unilateral Russian trade embargo imposed on Georgia since 2006, Tbilisi has shown no willingness to give a green light thus far. Thus, if Russia were to enter the WTO in 2011, as per President Barack Obama’s personal promise to President Dmitri Medvedev, Tbilisi would have to be offered something significant in return. What that might be is anybody’s guess and there are those, who speculate that Tbilisi might demand defensive weapons from the West, but be that as it may, clearly Tbilisi is in a better negotiating position than Washington. In this context, certainly Washington will be less likely to dictate anything to Tbilisi, especially when it comes to Georgia’s policy vis-à-vis North Caucasus, which is poorly understood here anyway.

Response to Walter Russell Mead's Blog Post "Georgia in the Crosshairs"

On October 28, 2010, the post entitled "Georgia in the Crosshairs" appeared on the blog of prominent American historian Walter Russell Mead [photo on the right courtesy of Pew Research Center website] at the website of The American Interest magazine. Apparently Mead recently traveled to Georgia, where he read lectures and had meetings in academic and government circles. Mead's previous blog posts on Georgia you can find here and here. Here is my response to Mead, which was also posted on his blog:

This post proves and exemplifies the frequent fallacy committed by Western social scientists with pompous academic credentials, who think they can become experts on Georgia and the Transcaucasus region after just one or two visits. The American nationalist, revisionist historian Walter Russell Mead is no exception to this rule. Of course, it would have been much better for him to stick to what he knows how to distort and embellish the best – namely the history of Anglo-American accomplishments. But academic figures of his stature are often characterized by such oversized egos that they are sure that their reputation is unassailable. The response below only partly aims to dispel this egotistical self-perception. It is largely intended to rebut some of Mead’s most ostentatious claims and factually incorrect observations.

In Mead’s highly amateur hodgepodge of facts, myths, truths, half-truths, unexamined assumptions and sweeping generalizations disguised as an authoritative crash course on Georgia, particular emphasis is placed on the incompetence, unpredictability and impulsiveness of the Georgian ruling elite as personified by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili. To recap Mead’s argument – bad decisions by the Georgian government produced “trust deficit” in European capitals and Washington and now Tbilisi is destined to linger in the dangerous geopolitical limbo, wherein it has no choice but to exercise “strategic patience” and to conduct modest foreign policy entirely subservient to American interests in the Caucasus region and vis-à-vis Russia. This, Mead argues, will hopefully, at some indefinite point, lead to closer relationship (but no membership) with European Union and perhaps better chances (but highly unlikely) at being considered for NATO membership. What a bright perspective indeed.

First of all, since the August 2008 war blaming all of Georgia’s misfortunes on the Georgian government has become a favorite pastime of many European and some American analysts, observers, experts as well as government officials. Pointing out real and perceived drawbacks of the Georgian decision makers in reality masks the inability and unwillingness of the American and European political establishment to do anything about Russia’s aggressive policy towards those post-Soviet countries that lean in the Western direction. Growing strategic dependence on Russia in Afghanistan further complicates and actually precludes any meaningful Western response in this regard. The result of this sad state of affairs has been the marked increase of Russian influence across the post-Soviet space.

Ukraine is the best case in point because anyone, who is even remotely familiar with current developments in that important country, has plenty to worry about because the Kremlin-friendly government of President Viktor Yanukovich has been systematically eroding the democratic achievements of the Orange Revolution. Moreover, following direct orders from Moscow Yanukovich now began to develop relations with world’s rogue authoritarian leaders as evidenced by the recent visit to Kyiv by the virulently anti-American leader of Venezuela Hugo Chavez.

In Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, the contours of the unequal and awkward Russo-American geopolitical condominium are beginning to materialize. Regardless of flowering rhetoric of official pronouncements, statements and speeches to the contrary, at the center of the American approach (because reactive positioning cannot be called policy) to Kyrgyzstan remains the uninterrupted operation of the Manas Transit Center. However, it is an open secret that the Kremlin exerts significant influence over Kyrgyz political circles and any decision on Manas will be taken only with Moscow’s approval. The success of the parliamentary model in Kyrgyzstan, which is espoused by the Obama administration, is far from assured considering Russian determination to keep American influence there checked at all times.

This brings us to Georgia. It is clear that in the context of the Obama administration’s “reset” policy with Russia, Georgia has become an inconvenient ally. The current U.S. approach to Georgia is predicated on the repetition of the familiar mantra of respect to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which does not really oblige Washington to do anything to change the untenable status quo there. This approach can be otherwise crudely summed up in a pithy American expression – words don’t cost a thing.

To be sure, in exchange for the generous diplomatic and financial support from Washington, Tbilisi, as a stalwart American ally, does what it can. Georgia’s contribution to the fledgling mission in Afghanistan is certainly appreciated by the U.S. and NATO officials, but apparently disregarded by Mead, who never mentions it in his meandering screed. Similarly the close bilateral cooperation in the counter-proliferation area that yielded the arrest and transfer to the United States of Amir Hossein Ardebili, one of the key Iranian arms dealers responsible for procurement abroad of weapons and dual-use items for Iranian armed forces, also somehow escaped Mead’s attention. It should be noted here that the Iranian government exerted significant pressure on Georgia to release Ardebili, but Tbilisi refused and risked angering Tehran. As a matter of fact, this individual was of such importance to Tehran’s clerical regime that during the official visit to Iran last year the Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze reportedly apologized to the Iranians for the Ardebili affair. Perhaps Mead would learn a thing or two by reading the most comprehensive and richly detailed account of the Operation Shakespeare, which was compiled by the investigative reporter John Shiffman and published in the Philadelphia Inquirer in September.

Second, with no apparent knowledge of the developments preceding the August 2008 war Mead asserts that Georgia pursued “reckless and aggressive policies toward Russia in the summer of 2008.” Had he read the relevant parts of the report prepared by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (more frequently referred to as simply Tagliavini Report for the name of the Swiss diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, who chaired the mission), he would have known that the Russian-Georgian war was preceded by the pattern of escalating tensions in which the Georgian-populated villages in South Ossetia were subjected to the increasing small arms fire and shelling by the South Ossetian separatist paramilitary forces.

Moreover, in the unlikely chance Mead would want to venture to examine the events that transpired in the spring of 2008, he will discover that with some support from Germany and active participation and mediation of the then Georgian Ambassador to UN, Irakli Alasania, the Georgian side approached the Abkhaz with the proposition that envisioned the partition of the territory of Abkhazia in return for the recognition of its independence. However, due to the pressure from Russia the Abkhaz rejected the partition proposal, which envisioned the reintegration of the Georgian-populated Gali region into Georgia in exchange for Tbilisi’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence.

With regard to the warnings from the Bush administration not to antagonize Russia, Mead ought to consider the official visit to Georgia by the then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July of 2008, less than a month before the beginning of hostilities in South Ossetia. Just as the Georgian airspace was being violated by the Russian aircraft, Secretary Rice casually assured the Georgian President: “We always fight for our friends.” In hindsight not the best choice of words given the extremely charged atmosphere on the eve of the conflict in which misperceptions and misinterpretations could have happened easily. In general, the deliberations on the American side prior, during and after the August war are meticulously described by Ronald Asmus in his seminal study A Little War that Shook the World.

Third, Mead expresses concern over the Georgian government’s decision to introduce the visa-free regime for the residents of the North Caucasus partly because he is concerned for the safety of the American expats living and working in Georgia and partly because such a move would irritate Russians. What Mead fails to realize is that the aforementioned decision serves Georgia’s long-term national interests in that volatile region. The best way to promote people-to-people interaction is to have a visa-free regime. The improvement of relations with the North Caucasian neighbors, over time, will have a positive impact on Georgia’s image among them. Developing good neighborly relations with the North Caucasian republics is of utmost importance to Georgia. Tbilisi remembers all too well what the neglect of this region produced in the early 1990s when, on the wave of separatist conflicts in Georgia, the North Caucasus region was permeated by the anti-Georgian sentiments. In presuming that all North Caucasians willing to take advantage of the visa-free regime are rebels or are somehow connected to them Mead commits another ignorant mistake, which actually borders on ethnic prejudice, the kind that is popular in certain Russian circles.

Fourth, by the time the doors of NATO may finally open for Georgia in accordance with the Bucharest summit commitments, the alliance may cease to exist altogether. Mead would hopefully benefit from reading about NATO’s inconsistent enlargement policy, diminished internal cohesion and inadequate military spending in this article.

The problems within NATO are manifest and they go beyond the apt typology of “Old” vs. “New” Europe introduced by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, they are perhaps the most painfully manifested in disagreements over Afghanistan and mandatory defense expenditures. Another area of constant tensions within the alliance is represented by the topic of contingency planning. For many representatives of “New” Europe in the alliance, who began to feel uneasy over Article V (collective defense) in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war this issue became extremely important. The Baltic States in particular felt defenseless and they insisted and belatedly received some assurance in the form of military exercises, which were most recently held in Latvia last month. Similar concern by Poland had to be allayed by the deployment of the Patriot missile battery and limited U.S. contingent there, which serves very little military purpose, but has tremendous political and symbolic significance.

Irrespective of what will be decided at the approaching Lisbon summit, in the context of the global economic crisis some NATO member-states intend to significantly reduce their military expenditures as part of the austerity measures. The recently brokered Anglo-French defense agreements are basically creative cost-cutting mechanisms, which make sense between the two highly compatible military force structures. However, it is easy to see in the medium- to long-run that unsustainable social welfare systems of European NATO members will invariably lead to more defense cuts to the detriment of the alliance. Therefore, while searching for external security guarantees will remain a top priority for Georgia, NATO may not be the only available option.

Finally, perhaps the only thing about which Mead is right is in pointing out that the Georgians should learn to be far more circumspect with regard to voicing their preferences between the Democratic or Republican parties. The Democratic Party has a long memory and in many ways the current Georgian government is still wrongly viewed by many party insiders and heavyweights as the neoconservative experiment closely associated with the Bush administration and its democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space. Overcoming this bias will not be easy, but it is not impossible. Georgians are not that beholden to illusions as it may seem at first glance by Mead. Many centuries of survival against the overwhelming odds taught them to be pragmatic and to balance the interests of other, more powerful players. Most recent confirmation of the latter was the official visit to Tbilisi by the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki this past Wednesday.

To Mead there is only this left to say – thanks for nothing. Your demagogic admonition to Georgia, its people and its leaders can be summed up in the following funny and bitter title of the article, which appeared on August 25, 2008 in the popular American satirical magazine The Onion: “U.S. Advises Allies Not To Border Russia.” Such advice is not worth a dime and you ought to keep it to yourself.

Georgia's New Threat Assessment Document Identifies Russia as a Main Threat

NOTE: This article was published in the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor today.

On September 2, 2010, the Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, signed Order No.707, which approved the adoption of the Georgia’s Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013. In accordance with Article 61 of Georgia’s General Administrative Code, the aforementioned document replaced the previous Threat Assessment Document for 2007-2009, which was adopted by the Presidential Order No.542 on September 24, 2007. The examination of the unclassified 7-page portion of the new threat assessment document provides unique insights into the global, regional and local threat perception of the current Georgian government.

According to the Preamble, “the Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013 [hereafter referred to as TDA] represents the fundamental conceptual document that identifies the threats facing Georgia and analyzes the scenarios of their possible development, their likelihoods and results.

TDA is based on the broad understanding of security that entails not only the assessment of the military-political threats but also of the socio-economic and terrorist threats as well as natural and technogenic catastrophes. The understanding of the aforementioned threats is necessary for the proper execution of government policy aimed at neutralizing the threats facing Georgia."

TDA is divided into the following five parts: I. Military threats, II. Foreign policy threats, III. Transnational threats, IV. Socio-economic threats, and V. Natural and technogenic threats and challenges.

The first part –Military threats– opens with the doctrinal statement that rules out the conduct of foreign affairs based on the politics of force as “posing a threat to the fundamental principles and norms of the global community.” Furthermore, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and subsequent Russian occupation of Georgia’s breakaway regions “made it clear that for the sake of its narrow interests the Russian Federation is willing to openly confront the fundamental principles and norms of international law, which represent the cornerstone of contemporary international relations.” It follows then that Russia’s continued occupation of the separatist territories “poses a direct threat to Georgia’s sovereignty, statehood and represents the most important factor of political, economic and social destabilization.” Therefore, “failure to comply with the international obligations of the ceasefire agreement by the Russian Federation, absence of international peacekeeping forces in the occupied territories, and the increasing militarization of the occupied territories increase the risk of provocations and create a possibility of new military aggression.”

The main aim of the policy of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis Georgia is “to disrupt the realization of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice and to compel Georgia by force to return to Russia’s orbit.” In this conceptual context the ultimate objective of the August 2008 military aggression “was not the occupation of Georgia’s territories or international recognition of the marionette regimes, but the removal of the pro-Western government of Georgia because the Russian ruling political elite considers independent and democratic Georgia a significant threat.” The failure to achieve that overarching objective and the unwillingness of the Russian ruling political elite to reconcile with the status quo “increase the expected threats and risks from Russia.”

The situation in the occupied territories is a significant source of risks. “The lawlessness dominating the occupied territories and the existence of illegally armed and criminal groups of the marionette regimes there negatively affect Georgia’s national security and increase the risk of provocations and incidents, especially in those areas immediately adjacent to the occupation line.”

Another important security challenge is represented by the existence of the conflict zones in Georgia’s neighboring countries. The possibility of spillover from those conflicts into Georgia represents a “challenge to Georgia’s national security” because “the transition of the regional conflicts to a more intensive phase and possible resumption of hostilities, along with other challenges, will cause a humanitarian crisis that will produce large refugee flows and will increase the danger that informal armed formations may enter the country along with the refugees.” Other harmful consequences of such developments also include “the increase in contraband and other types of transnational organized criminal activities” and “the deterioration of the regional security environment,” all of which “will threaten the transportation and energy projects existing in the Caucasus.”

The second part –Foreign policy threats– proclaims outright that the Russian Federation “spends significant resources in the international arena to carry out an anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” with the purpose of “derailing the transformation of Georgia into a state based on Western values.” Thus, the main objective of the aforementioned campaign is “to create the image of Georgia as a non-democratic and unstable state with aggressive aims.” TDA predicts that the Russian Federation “will continue an intensive and widespread anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” in order to “hinder Georgia’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.”

With the purpose of undermining Georgia’s statehood and territorial integrity the Russian government expends considerable political and financial resources on efforts aimed at achieving international recognition of the independence of Georgia’s occupied territories. TDA soberly admits that “despite the fact that the ‘independence’ of these regions was recognized only by Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru, the Russian government continues an active campaign on the international arena to legitimize the occupation of Georgia’s territories and to undermine the international legal status of Georgia’s sovereign territories by recognizing the marionette regimes.”

Equally noteworthy is the emphasis on “the demographic manipulations in the occupied territories,” which are recognized as “containing a threat to Georgia’s national security.” In particular, “the creation of supporting conditions for settling Russian citizens will extend the occupation and significantly complicate the de-occupation process.” In this regard, especially alarming “are those legal steps that are currently taken by the marionette regimes to give residence and private property rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the citizens of other countries” and “construction of so-called military settlements and reconstruction of military infrastructure that will encourage the arrival and settlement of the families of Russian military officials in the occupied territories.”

Georgian national interests are also threatened by the absence of international engagement in the occupied territories. Russia “expends exceptional efforts in order not to allow international engagement in the occupied territories, whereas it is precisely fully-fledged international engagement that represents a significant mechanism for achieving practical results in establishing security and stability in the occupied territories.”

The recap of the remaining parts of the TDA reveals that it is closely modeled on similar programmatic documents of Western countries and most importantly the National Security Strategy of the United States. Part III (Transnational threats) makes mention of the threats posed by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations and transnational criminal entities. This category of threats also includes cyber warfare. In this regard TDA notes that “during the August 2008 war the Russian Federation in parallel with land, air and sea attacks carried out concentrated and massive cyber assault on Georgia,” which demonstrated that “the use of computer technologies to carry out cyber attacks represents a real threat in the globalized world.” The lawlessness in the occupied territories represents another significant transnational security challenge. Among the types of criminal activity there “the illegal transit of components of weapons of mass destruction, illegal trade in weapons and narcotics, production and distribution of counterfeit currency, and human trafficking” pose particularly grave risks.

Finally, Part IV (Socio-economic threats) mainly discusses the threats to Georgia’s sustainable economic development posed by the global financial crisis, while Part V (Natural and technogenic threats and challenges) focuses on examining the ecologically dangerous developments in the occupied territories, challenges posed by Georgia’s location in the seismically active zone and such technogenic risks as chemical spills, accidents at hydroelectric power facilities, and emergencies on main pipelines.

The Georgian Association Statement Regarding the Sale of the Mistral Helicopter Carrier to Russia

February 16, 2010

On Monday, February 8, 2010, Jacques de Lajugie, the head of international sales at the French Defense Ministry’s weapons production agency (Direction Générale pour l'Armement or DGA), confirmed that the French government agreed to sell Russia one Mistral-class advanced amphibious helicopter carrier and is considering a request for three more.

Possession of this state-of-the-art assault ship will significantly increase Russia’s force projection capabilities in the Baltic and the Black Seas, which will considerably undermine the security of the US and NATO allies in the region. Russia’s willingness to use the Mistral assault ship against Georgia is evident in the remarks of Admiral Vladimir Visotskiy, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, who in September of last year noted that possession of this warship during the war with Georgia in 2008 would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its military objectives in forty minutes. In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed the [Russian] Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore]” (Interfax, September 11, 15).

The Mistral sale marks the first time a NATO country has willingly transferred to Russia an advanced offensive weapons platform. This is alarming given that the Kremlin’s recently released national military doctrine explicitly states that NATO’s eastward expansion is the main external military threat to the Russian Federation. The French decision threatens NATO alliance solidarity and ignores Eastern European members, who have repeatedly warned against the Mistral sale.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, during his recent visit to Paris expressed Washington’s concerns over the Mistral sale to his French counterpart, Hervé Morin, but with little result. Unfortunately the interests of the French manufacturer, DCNS, based at the shipyards in Saint-Nazaire, prevailed over much more significant geopolitical considerations. This decision sets a precedent for other arms producers in Western Europe, who will now see Russia as a lucrative market for advanced naval military technology.

The Georgian Association in the United Sates, Inc. strongly protests the French government’s decision to transfer the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship to Russia and calls on the United States Government to use all its diplomatic power to halt the sale. The Georgian Association also calls on the US government for pro-active Eastern European/Black Sea/Caspian policy to increase security and boost the regional cooperation.

Sincerely,

The Georgian Association in the United States

THE GEORGIAN ASSOCIATION IS A NONPARTISAN NATIONWIDE MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION OF GEORGIAN-AMERICANS AND FRIENDS OF GEORGIA THAT ADVOCATES FOR GEORGIA AND GEORGIAN ISSUES IN THE U.S. IT IS THE OLDEST ORGANIZATION IN THE US REPRESENTING THE GEORGIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY

2300 M Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20037
Phone:(202)234-2441
Fax:(202)234-2441
www.GeorgianAssociation.org

British Shadow Secretary of State for Defense Calls Russia a Threat

A week ago, on Tuesday, December 8, the Chatham House held the event "The Way Forward for NATO" featuring the British Shadow Secretary of State for Defense and Member of Parliament, Dr. Liam Fox (see photo on the right courtesy of www.liamfoxmp.co.uk), who delivered the speech on the future of the alliance. During the questions-and-answers session moderated by the Director of the Chatham House, Dr. Robin Niblett, Dr. Fox made a number of compelling remarks. Here are a couple of excerpts from the Q&A session, which can be streamed in its entirety (approximately half an hour) here:

On the geopolitical significance of globalization:

We do live in a very different global environment. I think that in many ways politicians have less grasp of globalization than the business community have. Politicians would like to talk about trade and prosperity, but they tend to focus much less on what is the unavoidable importation of strategic risk. If you have more widespread interests in more parts of the world, you are likely to be more threatened by more actors in more places. In many ways we are returning to a much more XIX century view of where we exist in the world rather than what may come to be seen as a blip of bipolarity of the XX century. And we'll have to re-learn some of the skills that we've had in dealing with that sort of global environment.


On Russia:

Tomas Valasek, Director of Foreign Policy and Defense at the Center for European Reform, who also advises Madeline Albright’s group of eminent personalities on the new NATO strategic concept, asked Dr. Liam Fox the following question:

Dr. Fox, thank you for your thoughtful remarks. One quick question on NATO-Russia. This is possibly the most divisive subject in the debates on the strategic concept so far. There are roughly three groups of allies if I might so stereotype them – those, who worry about Russia, particularly in Europe’s East and North and think of it as a possible future threat and want NATO to put in place preparations, contingency plans and exercises to prepare for the possibility; those, who do not think of Russia as a threat and think that concerns in Europe’s East and North are exaggerated; and those like Britain, if I might say so, and Canada, Denmark and others, who may be sympathetic to the concerns of those in Central Europe, but really think of Afghanistan as the right focus for NATO and possibly see in NATO paying more attention to Russia a distraction from NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Where would you stand on those issues? What sort of balance in your mind is required between the engagement of Russia and perhaps the reassurance of some of the allies against Russia and is reassurance indeed what NATO needs?

To which Fox responded:

I would add a fourth group, which is those, who really fear Russia, but pretend that they don’t, especially to Russia. They may be the biggest problem group that we have. I think Russia is a threat. Russia still targets weapons on us. Russia is still involved in the occupation of parts of Georgia. We’ve seen what happened in the Baltic States especially with the cyber attacks on Estonia. So let’s not pretend for a moment that Russia does not present us with the threat. It clearly does. But it also presents us with the opportunity. If we can find a way to deal with it in a constructive way, and I think what we need to do is to find language towards Russia, which is constructive, but strong and consistent. And I think the consistency is perhaps one of those things that we’ve lacked in our messaging and policy towards Russia in recent decades. So I think we have to find that. And I think…you know, in a rational world Russia would actually have a strong working relationship with the NATO alliance, with the West because we face many of the same problems of wider security, potential future threats of Islamist extremism Russia has on the southern border, of potential for nuclear proliferation, which we face in Iran, or wider issues of energy. But we do not live in a rational world and one of the problems in Russia is governance and the way Russia is governed and by whom makes a very big difference to Russia’s outlook. All we can try to do is to show Russia that we will be very strong in the defense of our borders, of those within our alliance, of our people and of our values, and ask them to work with us in areas where we have an overlap of common interests. And I think we need to go in without any preconditions, without overly optimistic views. And take a pragmatic and practical view to our relationships and establish confidence as far as we can along the way, but without fooling ourselves that we are entering some new golden era.

*************************************************************************************

NOTE: It appears that Dr. Fox's remarks caused some concern among unnamed Russian sources, as reported by the British website politics.co.uk.

A Chechen exile claims that Russia will intensify its efforts to fabricate the links tying Georgia to al Qaeda in the North Caucasus context

On October 13, 2009, during U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's first official visit to Russia, the Chairman of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) and the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Aleksandr Bortnikov (see the photo on the right courtesy of Kommersant) made the following remark during his speech at the NAC meeting:

"The audio reports discovered among the militants indicate that they jointly with the al Qaida emissaries have established contacts with the representatives of the Georgian special services, who participate in training and transfer of terrorists to the territory of the Chechen Republic.

In addition, they constantly carry out attempts to transfer weapons, explosives and funds for organizing sabotage operations at high-risk facilities of Dagestan, and, above all, at oil- and gas pipelines."

At first it seems this remark and its timing are not particularly surprising considering the well-established pattern of disinformation campaigns that the Kremlin periodically unleashes against Tbilisi to justify its bullying tactics against its impetuous southern neighbor. But the plot unexpectedly thickened when the once prominent Chechen exile in London, Akhmed Zakaev stepped into fray to provide some very interesting caveats. In the long and wide-ranging interview published in the popular Russian magazine Kommersant-Vlast No.42 (845) of October 26, 2009, among many interesting observations about his interactions with the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership, Zakaev noted the following:

Kommersant-Vlast Correspondent Musa Muradov: Why did the Sharia' court of Dokku Umarov sentence you to death?

Akhmed Zakaev: I was against the creation of the Caucasus Emirate. I wrote to Dokku that by declaring himself an Emir, he was going against the interests of the Chechen people.

Q: You are claiming that the Caucasus Emirate is the project of the special services. But Umarov's militants kill the Russian police officers and the special services operatives. Why would they create an enemy for themselves?

A: Since the announcement of the Caucasus Emirate, this war has turned into the war between the Caucasus people. In Chechnya Chechens are killed every day. In Ingushetia Ingushs. The local residents perish in Kabarda-Balkaria, Dagestan. The machine of self-destruction of the peoples of North Caucasus has been jump started.

Q: But during the special operations, I repeat, the FSB operatives die too.

A: Well they will be killed too. The Islamic militants, who fight in the North Caucasus, they are, of course, not the FSB agents. They are poisoned by the ideology, which they sincerely believe in and they believe that whatever they do now is exactly what is needed. And this is why they kill indiscriminately - police officers, FSB operatives and military personnel. The spiritual instructor of these duped boys has become Said Buriyatskiy, whose real last name is Tikhomirov. This person does not give a damn about the Chechens and their independence.

Putin stated that the Chechens fight not for the independence of the Chechen state, but for the creation of the Caliphate from sea to sea and you want us to allow them to carry on? We cannot allow them to do so! And this project has been in the works for some time. They have been working on it for a long time because earlier they wanted to transfer the national liberation movement into the sphere of struggle against the international terrorism. The project "Caucasus Emirate," and we can prove it, was developed at Lubyanka and was implemented by the FSB operatives. The project authors conceived that after its launch the struggle of the Chechen people for its freedom and independence would be presented as the struggle against the unbelievers. And Russia would transform from the aggressor that committed war crimes on the territory of Chechnya to the victim of the global jihad. And everyone sympathizing with or supporting the legitimate demands of the Chechen people would be equated with the accomplices of the Islamic extremists. According to our information, in the foreseeable future the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing to present to the United Nations Security Council the request regarding the recognition of the Caucasus Emirate as part of the al Qaeda, which will be complete with materials indicating the cooperation between the Georgian special services and the representatives of Dokku Umarov and the Caucasus Emirate. And the recent statement by the head of the FSB of Russia Bortnikov that there is al Qaeda in Georgia and that they [the Georgians] are helping to transport terrorists to the territory of Chechnya is precisely the kind of prelude to what they [the Russians] are preparing.

U.S. Defense Official's Remarks Regarding the New Missile Defense Architecture Raise Some False Hopes in Georgia

On Thursday, October 8, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia announced the dates of the visit by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Alexander Vershbow [Photo on the left courtesy of NATO]. Vershbow will be in Tbilisi on October 19-20. As I wrote already elsewhere, the U.S.-Georgian defense consultations, which will proceed during Vershbow's visit, will be conducted within the framework of the bi-lateral Security Working Group - one of the four working groups (others are on democracy, economic development and people-to-people relations) set up under the aegis of the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission, which, in turn, was founded earlier this year in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed on January 9, 2009. It should be noted that in late September Vershbow paid a working visit to Moscow, where, according to his September 30 interview with the Russian news agency Interfax, he was suppose to gauge Russia's "reaction to President Obama's [missile defense] decision and to determine whether Russia is interested in establishing a basis for cooperation on this." Vershbow's Interfax interview is compelling for a number of reasons some of which are cited below in the form of thematically arranged direct excerpts from the interview transcript:

Does the U.S. expect anything in return from Russia for Washington's changed stand on the missile defense issue?

Interfax: After revising its global missile defense plans, does the U.S. expect Russia to make reciprocal steps, including those regarding its stance on Iran’s nuclear program and the possible exports of S-300 air defense systems to Tehran?

Vershbow: The new approach which we have decided upon for missile defense was based on an analysis of the threats and of the available technologies, and was not presented as something on which we expected any quid pro quo. But the issue of the possible Russian transfer of the S-300 is a very critical issue in its own right, and we have said to Russia many times that we believe that that system could be very destabilizing in the region, and therefore have urged Russia to exercise restraint. So this is not something which we are negotiating on but simply something that we believe that Russia should see as in its own interest.

On Russia's concerns about the configuration of the Obama administration's new missile defense system:

Interfax: How would you comment on the concerns of some Russian experts that the new U.S. anti-missile system could be even more dangerous to Russia than the previous one, and if need be could Washington provide guarantee to Moscow that the U.S. missile defense program will not be targeted against Russia?

Vershbow: We look forward to further consultations with Russia to explain in greater detail than we have thus far the characteristics of the new system. Russia has already been briefed, primarily through the Russian ambassador in Washington who is a great expert in these matters. So we think Russia understands already the basic elements of the new architecture. But the whole rational for this new system is to deal with the threat from Iran, both the existing threats from short and medium range missiles, which are deployed today and already are capable of threatening not only Iran’s middleeastern neighbors but also some of our NATO allies in southeastern Europe. That’s what the first phases of the new system are focused on, providing immediate protection of our allies in the south east [of Europe]. But over time, to deal with future Iranian missiles which are already in the testing stage, and which will have longer range capacity to threaten allies in central Europe and northern Europe, the characteristics of the missiles which we are developing and the overall architecture, in our view, does not present any threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. And so far I think we have found some understanding from Russia in this regard. But still, it is a new system and we are fully prepared to engage in consultations with Russia to answer any questions and to explore possibilities for cooperation. Iranian ballistic missiles are a potential threat not just to NATO but to all countries within range of these systems, and cooperating on either a U.S.-Russia or a NATO-Russia basis would be a very valuable way to strengthen our common security.

On the possibility of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the missile defense area:

Interfax: In what particular areas can Russia and the U.S. cooperate on missile defense? Does Washington consider the possibility that the two countries could jointly operate the Russian radar station in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and its S-300 and S-400 air defense systems?

Vershbow: Secretary of Defense Gates and other senior defense officials have already pointed to the possibility of some form of link between Russian radars at Armavir, at Gabala, to provide additional data and early warning information that could benefit both of us in defending against ballistic missile threats. Exactly how these links would be established and how it would work technically is of course for the experts. But I think that the basic idea of sharing this kind of information against a common threat makes sense. And of course it could be just the beginning of a program of cooperation between NATO and Russia or between the United States and Russia on missile defense.

On the possibility of including the Caucasus in the new missile defense configuration:

Interfax: The U.S. missile shield plan reportedly envisions the deployment of some of its elements in the Caucasus. Could it be in Georgia, Azerbaijan, or some other state?

Vershbow: We are just at an early stage of designing this system and we are just beginning consultations with the allies in the southeast European region, as well as all our allies who could be part of the system in the long term. So, it’s really too early to comment on what countries might be participants in this system. I think that General O’Reilly, the head of our missile agency has emphasized that one of the keys to this system is to have an early warning radar relatively close to Iran, within a thousand kilometers of Iran, to provide an immediate detection of a launch, so that the rest of the system could do good work trying to intercept the missile before it hits its target.

Interfax: Could Georgia be part of it?

Vershbow: I really cannot say anything about specific countries. Right now we are consulting with our NATO allies. I can’t say anything more. Russian General Staff Chief Nikolai Makarov told that Russia had a negative attitude to the possible deployment of U.S. missile defense sites in the Caucasus. I think the important thing to remember is that we are talking about defending against the potential threat and potential attacks against our territory, our allies’ territory, and potentially Russian territory. I think that defensive strategies are inherently ones that bring countries together, countries that are facing a common threat. So that’s why we would hope that we can establish a basis for cooperation with Russia, so that everyone interested are protected.

On the American-Russian transit agreement for supplying U.S.-led coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan, which has not been implemented yet:

Interfax: When is the U.S. going to start using its right of military transit to Afghanistan through Russia?

Vershbow: I can’t give you an exact date (when the U.S. will start transit through Afghanistan) There are still some procedural issues that are not quite completed. I don’t think there are any differences between the countries, but there are some processes that have to run their course. We are hoping that these flights can begin very soon. The agreement in July was a very important commitment by Russia to contribute to the success of the NATO operation in Afghanistan. And putting that agreement to effect, I think, will not only be of practical value, but will be a strong signal to people of Afghanistan and to the surrounding region that the United States and Russia are working together to deal with a major challenge to international security.

On the recently published EU-sponsored report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (the so-called Tagliavini report):

Interfax: An independent international commission has determined that it was Georgia which started the war in the South Caucasus last August. Do you think these findings could affect the U.S.’ military cooperation with Georgia?

Vershbow: Washington is still studying this report, from what I have read only in the news it talks about the responsibility of both sides, but I think that it is really premature to draw any other conclusions before we have a chance to fully assess the report. We have always stood by Georgia’s sovereignty and independence and we will continue to support Georgia’s sovereignty and independence, and in the context of this report we should await the first comments of the [U.S.] State Department.

Vershbow's Caucasus comment probably gave the Georgian political expert and security analyst Gia Nodia the reason to tell the Armenian on-line news channel News.am on October 5 that the combination of the U.S. strategic interests in the region and threat of terrorism makes the establishment of the elements of the new missile defense system in Georgia likely. Nodia stated, "U.S. has an opportunity to use Georgia's territory, and its strategic interests quite allow them to do so." At the same time, on the official level, the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze avoided speculation when on the same day he stated that the U.S. has not addressed Georgia about the possibility of deployment of missile defense system in Georgia yet. While the latter, wait-and-see approach is obviously far more prudent under the circumstances, U.S. Secretary of Sate Hillary Clinton's remarks during her first recently concluded trip to Russia indeed provide a glimmer of hope that the U.S.-Georgian defense cooperation will not be bulldozed altogether by the priorities of the "reset" with Moscow. In her joint press conference with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 13, Secretary Clinton openly admitted that, when it comes to Georgia, the U.S. and Russia basically agree to disagree ("We will not see eye-to-eye on Georgia"). More importantly, in her interview with the opposition-minded radiostation Ekho Moskvy on October 14, Secretary Clinton simultaenously poured cold water on unrealistic missile defense expectations of some in Tbilisi while providing reassurances regarding the continuous defense assistance to Georgia. Here's the relevant excerpt from the interview transcript:

A. Venediktov: In this regard we understand the concern of Mr. Lavrov, and I would like to ask you directly - will the elements of the missile defense system be located on the territory of Georgia that causes disagreements between you?

H. Clinton: Yes, and I have no reason to believe at all that anything would be deployed in Georgia. No, I have no reason to believe that, and that is, I know, a matter of great concern to the Russian Federation. But again, that’s why we would like to work with – we would like to eliminate the concerns. We would like to have a joint missile defense program to protect our people, your people, our European friends and allies, to put as broad a missile defense system so that we can guard against short and medium-range missile that might have nuclear weapons.

A. Venediktov: Madame Secretary, did Mr. Lavrov rise the question of re-arming the Georgian army by your country and what did you respond to him?

H. Clinton: We talked about Georgia. Now we do have a difference there, and even though we are working hard to not just reset our relationship, but deepen our relationship, we will disagree about Georgia. Georgia is providing troops in Afghanistan. We are training Georgians to be able to go to Afghanistan. But we’re also making it very clear that we expect both the Georgians and the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians and everyone else to avoid provocative action, to deal with whatever problems they have through peaceful and diplomatic means.

A. Venediktov: But re-arming of and support to the Georgian army, Madame Secretary, concerns Russia a great deal.

H. Clinton: Minister Lavrov did not ask me that question, but we will help the Georgia people to feel like they can defend themselves.

A. Venediktov: This means that Minister Lavrov behaved himself like a gentleman. Usually he asks such questions. With you he behaved like a gentleman.

H. Clinton: Well, I think he knew the answer.

As officially announced, main topics of U.S.-Georgian defense consultations during Vershbow's visit to Tbilisi will focus on the Georgian defense reform, contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan and regional security issues. Undoubtedly speculations will proliferate about what all this will mean for Georgia's ability (or rather lack thereof) to defend itself and one suggestion that seems to be almost intuitive is that Tbilisi will certainly be better off if it suppresses its desire to boast success in this sensitive area, when none is to be noted.

French Foreign Minister's Interesting Interview with Ekho Moskvy

On Thursday, October 1, 2009, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner gave a wide-ranging interview to the radio host and astute observer Aleksei Venediktov from Russia's only remaining opposition-minded radio station Ekho Moskvy. [See photo on the left. Courtesy of Natalia Zhukova, Radio Ekho Moskvy.] It should be noted that the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner and French Defense Minister Herve Morin were in Moscow last week to meet with their Russian counterparts in the 2+2 format. As it turns out, the meeting agenda included the discussions regarding the possibility of Russia's purchase of the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier. What follows is the verbatim English translation of the excerpts from the interview transcript posted on the website of the Ekho Moskvy:

On the Russia-Georgia war of 2008:

A. Venediktov: You mentioned sanctions. A year ago, when there was a war between Russia and Georgia, you also spoke of possible sanctions. At the time you did not exclude the possibility of sanctions against Russia. I am asking you the question now. Has your position to this war and its consequences in Russia and Georgia changed, Mr. Minister?

B. Kushner: Well, hold on...You constantly...

A. Venediktov: Indeed it was you, who spoke of sanctions!

B. Kushner: No, I speak of peace. I said three times: 'Peace, peace, peace!' Chances are...when the confrontation is approaching and then there are very few means to...[inaudible] that confrontation. That's the possibility of war. And we do not want it.

A. Venediktov: Nonetheless, the European Council issued the report on the war between Russia and Georgia. Our radio listeners are asking, you personally, Mr. Kushner, who was one of the actors in the creation of the post-war system...

B. Kushner: I am a professional actor.

A. Venediktov: I agree. Tell me, please, do you think the situation between Russia and Georgia is a dead end? Everything is frozen and will remain as is.

B. Kushner: I hope not. By the way, the French, European Union does everything in order to avoid the dead end. So I am returning to your first question. There is a report, but I do not have it with me. I am very careful in my phrases here because I need to familiarize myself with the details of that report. From what I read though, in the report it is written that Mr. Saakashvili started the war in Tskhinvali on the night of August 8. Almost immediately I, as you know, and President Sarkozy arrived in Moscow and then met in Georgia.

It was August 10 and the Russian troops were approaching Tbilisi. I did not see it myself, what the devastation was in Tskhinvali. Then I saw that there were bombings at night, there was a night bombing. We cannot claim that. And without a doubt these hostilities led to [inaudible]. After that there were many provocations from both sides. Between these two populations, who used to reside together. It is a valley and only about 200 meters separate the neighbors. And mountains are within about 3 kilometers. It is a very small distance. Between the South Ossetia and the towns of Georgia, which are nearby, within several kilometers.

The tanks were already in Gori, where the great Stalin was born. Still I find it somewhat strange. The separation. Stalin drew that map in such a manner so as to avoid a confrontation. Thus, there were mutliple provocations, they began to bomb the city, then the troops showed up. I think we need to condemn both. And the problem of borders in Europe should not be resolved by the use of force. I think not just in Europe but in the whole world. We shall study this report very carefully. I do not know if this was a lack of success, failure. But I think France at the time presided over the European Union and it undertook diplomatic efforts.

That is why now I come here and will be discussing issues with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs and the president. There were changes in the French diplomacy. Can we consider that we achieved some success? I do not know. We slowed down the possible consequences. I think there were chances that the Russians could go to Tbilisi. I do not know whether or not this problem is solved. But in the end there are negotiations under way in Geneva. It is important that they continue. These are very important meetings. Everyone is meeting in Geneva. I hope that the solution will be found in the end. Since then we have not recognized either Ossetia or Abkhazia. Only two countries did - Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Please, consider the influence of this decision.

A.Venediktov: Mr. Minister, do you think the Russian side thoroughly fulfilled the Sarkozy-Medvedev plan?

B. Kushner: No, no, no.

A. Venediktov: What's left?

B. Kushner: In particular, the European observers, who were in the zone and with whom we talked and told that every detail was important. From my point of view, I think it is important to start and to calm things down somehow, I understand that the borders are not suitable for Russia and I know under what conditions they were drawn. That was the moment when Gorbachev and Yeltsin were in power. That was not my fault. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of Communists, that was not our fault. Already back then the situation was not so great. At some point this needs to be resolved. Let's start with keeping there the European observers, there are three hundred of them there. We managed to gather them in fifteen days and they represent all countries of Europe. These observers should be on the both sides of the border because it is necessary.

And in particular, in Ossetia. And you know the distance there is literally within two steps. We do not want to provoke the war. This is the force of peace and monitoring.

A. Venediktov: Mr. Minister, some of your compatriots and your Georgian compatriots talk about the fact that when it comes to issues related to Georgia, Sarkozy resembles Daladier and that this is the new Munich of 1938, when France surrendered Georgia as at the time Daladier surrendered Czechoslovakia. How do you like this comparison?

B. Kushner: Well, you know, if we talk about Munich, well...I think this was invoked many times before about the similar situations. No, I remember, I recall very clearly. I was not born then, but Munich was a completely different situation. And England and France backed away under the pressure of Nazism. Of course, that's not at all what we have here. After all, I want to emphasize here that the Americans were nowhere to be seen. It is convenient to dispense advice that it is important to display strength and courage from afar. But we did it with own hands with President Sarkozy to end the war.

And in this regard Russia participated, fulfilled the agreement, which we signed on paper here, in Moscow and then later in Tbilisi. After that Ms. Condoleezza Rice, who was still the foreign minister then, as you know, wrote the letter saying that this was absolutely unsatisfactory. The Russian troops occupied territories, which were not theirs and they stayed on those territories. I will tell you the following. I am proud that I went to the North Ossetia and that I visited refugees there. Nobody wanted me to go there and I was told I had no right and everyone wanted to force me not to go there, both Russians and Georgians.

And then I met with the refugees. I spent 2-3 hours with them. And these poor people were desperate, there were, of course, casualties, they were in the utter despair. There were refugees on the other side as well. But this is not a unilateral decision. We cannot resolve this on our continent with war.

On the possibility of selling the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier to Russia:

A. Venediktov: Lately there is much talk about the military-technical cooperation between France and Russia. In particular, the French military are interested in the helicopter carrier Mistral. Does the French government support Russia in its willingness to buy the French equipment and in particular Mistral?

B. Kushner: You are right. It's good that you mentioned the military-technical cooperation. This is also a political cooperation. We meet with the defense and foreign affairs ministers sometimes in Paris and sometimes in Moscow. You understand that we trust each other. By the way, Mr. Medvedev will meet us today. In particular, the negotiations are technical. Mistral is a great vessel, very functional. There is a certain political procedure involved here and it is important for that procedure to be fulfilled. It is important to fulfill it in order to achieve a political agreement. If this political agreement is reached, since I do not decide, but I think that there is a representative from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who deals with that, then I hope you will be able to acquire this wonderful Mistral.

What I want to say is that France wants to develop the European defense policy. But at the same time we would like to have a certain area, a zone of joint defense, joint security...

A. Venediktov: Without the U.S.A?

B. Kushner: No. No. Of course, U.S.A. could be there as well, but Medvedev's proposal is as follows. He spoke of the zone of European security, I think he spoke of it in Kaliningrad. We said: 'Yes.' But where are the proposals? Thus far they are being discussed in diplomatic circles, after the conference at the OSCE, precisely at the OSCE. Of course, that's the only organization, where there are Americans, Europeans and Russians. And we ought to talk through this organization. We are ready to talk about it. We want to see the zone of the European countries plus Balkans and if they want to join, I welcome it.

And there will be another zone with our Russian friends, which will be the zone of security.

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Instant commentariat:

Regardless of how bad (or good) was the quality of the simultaneous French-to-Russian interpreter, who was attending the interview, it is still possible to draw some raw observations regarding specific points raised above:

• The French Foreign Minister displays a remarkable lack of knowledge of the most basic facts about the conflict in South Ossetia.
• He admits that the there was a possibility that the Russians could have entered Tbilisi.
• He is still bitter about the fact that Americans showed no leadership throughout the hottest phase of the confrontation last August.
• He still considers himself a great humanitarian for participating in photo ops with the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from South Ossetia in Georgia and refugees in North Ossetia.
  
• He carelessly acknowledges that the Russo-French negotiations over the Mistral deal are advanced (see "technical" above) and by "a certain political procedure" he most likely means the inconvenient requirement to obtain the green light from Washington since nothing that contains U.S.-manufactured defense-related component (and Mistral undoubtedly contains quite a few of those) can be sold to or patented out to another country without an approval, which is likely to be a very time-consuming endeavor.
• He vaguely outlines possible tenets of French view on European defense policy, which apparently entails an area of joint defense and/or security with Russia.