Georgian Foreign Minister's Interview Sheds Light on Georgia's Negotiating Positions at the Geneva Talks

This past Friday, March 4, 2011, marked the conclusion of the fifteenth round of the multilateral negotiations in Geneva between the government delegations from Georgia, Russian Federation, European Union, and the United States, with the participation of the representatives of the separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As was widely expected, no progress has been achieved on the most important issues, including committing Russia to a non-use of force pledge and allowing international security mechanisms in the breakaway regions. In general, since the EU, OSCE and UN jointly initiated the talks two months after the Russian-Georgian war in October 2008, the Geneva negotiations have been characterized by continuous stalemate with occasional bouts of theatricality orchestrated by the Russian side with support from its Abkhazian and South Ossetian proxies, which usually amount to demonstrative walk-outs and other attempts to obstruct the fledgling process. Although devoid of any practical impact, the Geneva negotiations are important for the American and Western diplomatic establishment only for the sake of maintaining some sort of dialogue between the sides that otherwise have no other channels of diplomatic communication. [NOTE: At present Georgia and Russia have no diplomatic relations. Geneva talks is the only forum, where Russian and Georgian diplomats meet face to face.] In other words, it is a classic case of "negotiations for the sake of negotiations."

About a week before the fifteenth round of the Geneva talks, on Thursday, 24 February, 2011, the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze [photo on the right courtesy of tbilisiwebinfo.wordpress.com] gave an exclusive interview to the Russian Service of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in which he highlighted some of Tbilisi's negotiating positions. Here is the selected verbatim recap of Vashadze's answers to questions by the RFE/RL journalist Irina Lagunina:

Q: What will the official Tbilisi present at the fifteenth round?

A: You know, Georgia exhausted its limit of initiatives. The last that we did was that on November 23 of last year, the President of Georgia gave a speech at the European Parliament in which he took upon himself and on Georgia the legal obligation not to use the force against the occupation forces and occupation regimes. This was appropriately documented in the legal sense. We sent letters in which we confirmed that we undertook legal obligations to all international organizations, including those that are co-hosts of the Geneva negotiations, to European Union because European Union is a co-host of Geneva talks, to the President of the United States of America because the United States of America is a full-fledged participant in the Geneva talks. In other words, we documented our obligations appropriately.

Now it is time for the Russian side to act. They should take upon themselves the same obligation that they will not use force against Georgia. There are military plans for such a war. You know, there is an absolutely hysterical campaign aimed at the militarization of the occupied territories. In response to Georgia's November 23 initiative, Russia deployed in the occupied territories quite dangerous not only for Georgia but also for the entire region offensive weapons, including Uragan [Uragan 9K57 Multiple Launch Rocket System], Smerch [Smerch 9K58 Multiple Launch Rocket System], S-300 [S-300 Surface-to-Air Missile System], and Tochka U [OTP-21 Tochka U Mobile Tactical Ballistic Missile Launch System]. This last one, as you know, can be equipped not only with the conventional warhead, which is dreadful in and of itself because it is comprised of 50 cassette [cluster] bombs, but also with the nuclear warhead. Why would Russia need Tochka U in the South Caucasus is not quite clear at all.

Q: But Russia presents itself at the talks as the moderator and not as one of the parties to the conflict.

A: Irina, this is precisely why the negotiations are paralyzed. On the one hand, Georgia and the United States are asking, demanding, insisting, begging, convincing Russia so that it would look at things as they are. On the other hand, there is an attempt to play out a "groundhog's day," as with Afghanistan, as with the so-called socialist camp and other attributes of the 20th century. In other words, they put in front of us these clowns, these occupation regimes and then they tell us to talk to them. Although there were many attempts to talk with them since 1991, which is when the occupation of these regions of Georgia actually began. Russia categorically refuses to talk with Georgia, to recognize Georgia as a sovereign state, to recognize our territorial integrity, to recognize the legally and democratically elected government, and the legally and democratically elected President. At the last round of negotiations the talks ended at the fifteenth minute, when the delegations of Georgia and the United States demanded from Russia to undertake commitment not to use military force. That happened during the meeting of the first working group. In the second working group Russia declared that the refugees will never return to their places of residence and will never get back their houses.

Response to Walter Russell Mead's Blog Post "Georgia in the Crosshairs"

On October 28, 2010, the post entitled "Georgia in the Crosshairs" appeared on the blog of prominent American historian Walter Russell Mead [photo on the right courtesy of Pew Research Center website] at the website of The American Interest magazine. Apparently Mead recently traveled to Georgia, where he read lectures and had meetings in academic and government circles. Mead's previous blog posts on Georgia you can find here and here. Here is my response to Mead, which was also posted on his blog:

This post proves and exemplifies the frequent fallacy committed by Western social scientists with pompous academic credentials, who think they can become experts on Georgia and the Transcaucasus region after just one or two visits. The American nationalist, revisionist historian Walter Russell Mead is no exception to this rule. Of course, it would have been much better for him to stick to what he knows how to distort and embellish the best – namely the history of Anglo-American accomplishments. But academic figures of his stature are often characterized by such oversized egos that they are sure that their reputation is unassailable. The response below only partly aims to dispel this egotistical self-perception. It is largely intended to rebut some of Mead’s most ostentatious claims and factually incorrect observations.

In Mead’s highly amateur hodgepodge of facts, myths, truths, half-truths, unexamined assumptions and sweeping generalizations disguised as an authoritative crash course on Georgia, particular emphasis is placed on the incompetence, unpredictability and impulsiveness of the Georgian ruling elite as personified by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili. To recap Mead’s argument – bad decisions by the Georgian government produced “trust deficit” in European capitals and Washington and now Tbilisi is destined to linger in the dangerous geopolitical limbo, wherein it has no choice but to exercise “strategic patience” and to conduct modest foreign policy entirely subservient to American interests in the Caucasus region and vis-à-vis Russia. This, Mead argues, will hopefully, at some indefinite point, lead to closer relationship (but no membership) with European Union and perhaps better chances (but highly unlikely) at being considered for NATO membership. What a bright perspective indeed.

First of all, since the August 2008 war blaming all of Georgia’s misfortunes on the Georgian government has become a favorite pastime of many European and some American analysts, observers, experts as well as government officials. Pointing out real and perceived drawbacks of the Georgian decision makers in reality masks the inability and unwillingness of the American and European political establishment to do anything about Russia’s aggressive policy towards those post-Soviet countries that lean in the Western direction. Growing strategic dependence on Russia in Afghanistan further complicates and actually precludes any meaningful Western response in this regard. The result of this sad state of affairs has been the marked increase of Russian influence across the post-Soviet space.

Ukraine is the best case in point because anyone, who is even remotely familiar with current developments in that important country, has plenty to worry about because the Kremlin-friendly government of President Viktor Yanukovich has been systematically eroding the democratic achievements of the Orange Revolution. Moreover, following direct orders from Moscow Yanukovich now began to develop relations with world’s rogue authoritarian leaders as evidenced by the recent visit to Kyiv by the virulently anti-American leader of Venezuela Hugo Chavez.

In Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, the contours of the unequal and awkward Russo-American geopolitical condominium are beginning to materialize. Regardless of flowering rhetoric of official pronouncements, statements and speeches to the contrary, at the center of the American approach (because reactive positioning cannot be called policy) to Kyrgyzstan remains the uninterrupted operation of the Manas Transit Center. However, it is an open secret that the Kremlin exerts significant influence over Kyrgyz political circles and any decision on Manas will be taken only with Moscow’s approval. The success of the parliamentary model in Kyrgyzstan, which is espoused by the Obama administration, is far from assured considering Russian determination to keep American influence there checked at all times.

This brings us to Georgia. It is clear that in the context of the Obama administration’s “reset” policy with Russia, Georgia has become an inconvenient ally. The current U.S. approach to Georgia is predicated on the repetition of the familiar mantra of respect to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which does not really oblige Washington to do anything to change the untenable status quo there. This approach can be otherwise crudely summed up in a pithy American expression – words don’t cost a thing.

To be sure, in exchange for the generous diplomatic and financial support from Washington, Tbilisi, as a stalwart American ally, does what it can. Georgia’s contribution to the fledgling mission in Afghanistan is certainly appreciated by the U.S. and NATO officials, but apparently disregarded by Mead, who never mentions it in his meandering screed. Similarly the close bilateral cooperation in the counter-proliferation area that yielded the arrest and transfer to the United States of Amir Hossein Ardebili, one of the key Iranian arms dealers responsible for procurement abroad of weapons and dual-use items for Iranian armed forces, also somehow escaped Mead’s attention. It should be noted here that the Iranian government exerted significant pressure on Georgia to release Ardebili, but Tbilisi refused and risked angering Tehran. As a matter of fact, this individual was of such importance to Tehran’s clerical regime that during the official visit to Iran last year the Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze reportedly apologized to the Iranians for the Ardebili affair. Perhaps Mead would learn a thing or two by reading the most comprehensive and richly detailed account of the Operation Shakespeare, which was compiled by the investigative reporter John Shiffman and published in the Philadelphia Inquirer in September.

Second, with no apparent knowledge of the developments preceding the August 2008 war Mead asserts that Georgia pursued “reckless and aggressive policies toward Russia in the summer of 2008.” Had he read the relevant parts of the report prepared by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (more frequently referred to as simply Tagliavini Report for the name of the Swiss diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, who chaired the mission), he would have known that the Russian-Georgian war was preceded by the pattern of escalating tensions in which the Georgian-populated villages in South Ossetia were subjected to the increasing small arms fire and shelling by the South Ossetian separatist paramilitary forces.

Moreover, in the unlikely chance Mead would want to venture to examine the events that transpired in the spring of 2008, he will discover that with some support from Germany and active participation and mediation of the then Georgian Ambassador to UN, Irakli Alasania, the Georgian side approached the Abkhaz with the proposition that envisioned the partition of the territory of Abkhazia in return for the recognition of its independence. However, due to the pressure from Russia the Abkhaz rejected the partition proposal, which envisioned the reintegration of the Georgian-populated Gali region into Georgia in exchange for Tbilisi’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence.

With regard to the warnings from the Bush administration not to antagonize Russia, Mead ought to consider the official visit to Georgia by the then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July of 2008, less than a month before the beginning of hostilities in South Ossetia. Just as the Georgian airspace was being violated by the Russian aircraft, Secretary Rice casually assured the Georgian President: “We always fight for our friends.” In hindsight not the best choice of words given the extremely charged atmosphere on the eve of the conflict in which misperceptions and misinterpretations could have happened easily. In general, the deliberations on the American side prior, during and after the August war are meticulously described by Ronald Asmus in his seminal study A Little War that Shook the World.

Third, Mead expresses concern over the Georgian government’s decision to introduce the visa-free regime for the residents of the North Caucasus partly because he is concerned for the safety of the American expats living and working in Georgia and partly because such a move would irritate Russians. What Mead fails to realize is that the aforementioned decision serves Georgia’s long-term national interests in that volatile region. The best way to promote people-to-people interaction is to have a visa-free regime. The improvement of relations with the North Caucasian neighbors, over time, will have a positive impact on Georgia’s image among them. Developing good neighborly relations with the North Caucasian republics is of utmost importance to Georgia. Tbilisi remembers all too well what the neglect of this region produced in the early 1990s when, on the wave of separatist conflicts in Georgia, the North Caucasus region was permeated by the anti-Georgian sentiments. In presuming that all North Caucasians willing to take advantage of the visa-free regime are rebels or are somehow connected to them Mead commits another ignorant mistake, which actually borders on ethnic prejudice, the kind that is popular in certain Russian circles.

Fourth, by the time the doors of NATO may finally open for Georgia in accordance with the Bucharest summit commitments, the alliance may cease to exist altogether. Mead would hopefully benefit from reading about NATO’s inconsistent enlargement policy, diminished internal cohesion and inadequate military spending in this article.

The problems within NATO are manifest and they go beyond the apt typology of “Old” vs. “New” Europe introduced by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, they are perhaps the most painfully manifested in disagreements over Afghanistan and mandatory defense expenditures. Another area of constant tensions within the alliance is represented by the topic of contingency planning. For many representatives of “New” Europe in the alliance, who began to feel uneasy over Article V (collective defense) in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war this issue became extremely important. The Baltic States in particular felt defenseless and they insisted and belatedly received some assurance in the form of military exercises, which were most recently held in Latvia last month. Similar concern by Poland had to be allayed by the deployment of the Patriot missile battery and limited U.S. contingent there, which serves very little military purpose, but has tremendous political and symbolic significance.

Irrespective of what will be decided at the approaching Lisbon summit, in the context of the global economic crisis some NATO member-states intend to significantly reduce their military expenditures as part of the austerity measures. The recently brokered Anglo-French defense agreements are basically creative cost-cutting mechanisms, which make sense between the two highly compatible military force structures. However, it is easy to see in the medium- to long-run that unsustainable social welfare systems of European NATO members will invariably lead to more defense cuts to the detriment of the alliance. Therefore, while searching for external security guarantees will remain a top priority for Georgia, NATO may not be the only available option.

Finally, perhaps the only thing about which Mead is right is in pointing out that the Georgians should learn to be far more circumspect with regard to voicing their preferences between the Democratic or Republican parties. The Democratic Party has a long memory and in many ways the current Georgian government is still wrongly viewed by many party insiders and heavyweights as the neoconservative experiment closely associated with the Bush administration and its democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space. Overcoming this bias will not be easy, but it is not impossible. Georgians are not that beholden to illusions as it may seem at first glance by Mead. Many centuries of survival against the overwhelming odds taught them to be pragmatic and to balance the interests of other, more powerful players. Most recent confirmation of the latter was the official visit to Tbilisi by the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki this past Wednesday.

To Mead there is only this left to say – thanks for nothing. Your demagogic admonition to Georgia, its people and its leaders can be summed up in the following funny and bitter title of the article, which appeared on August 25, 2008 in the popular American satirical magazine The Onion: “U.S. Advises Allies Not To Border Russia.” Such advice is not worth a dime and you ought to keep it to yourself.

Georgia's New Threat Assessment Document Identifies Russia as a Main Threat

NOTE: This article was published in the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor today.

On September 2, 2010, the Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, signed Order No.707, which approved the adoption of the Georgia’s Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013. In accordance with Article 61 of Georgia’s General Administrative Code, the aforementioned document replaced the previous Threat Assessment Document for 2007-2009, which was adopted by the Presidential Order No.542 on September 24, 2007. The examination of the unclassified 7-page portion of the new threat assessment document provides unique insights into the global, regional and local threat perception of the current Georgian government.

According to the Preamble, “the Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013 [hereafter referred to as TDA] represents the fundamental conceptual document that identifies the threats facing Georgia and analyzes the scenarios of their possible development, their likelihoods and results.

TDA is based on the broad understanding of security that entails not only the assessment of the military-political threats but also of the socio-economic and terrorist threats as well as natural and technogenic catastrophes. The understanding of the aforementioned threats is necessary for the proper execution of government policy aimed at neutralizing the threats facing Georgia."

TDA is divided into the following five parts: I. Military threats, II. Foreign policy threats, III. Transnational threats, IV. Socio-economic threats, and V. Natural and technogenic threats and challenges.

The first part –Military threats– opens with the doctrinal statement that rules out the conduct of foreign affairs based on the politics of force as “posing a threat to the fundamental principles and norms of the global community.” Furthermore, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and subsequent Russian occupation of Georgia’s breakaway regions “made it clear that for the sake of its narrow interests the Russian Federation is willing to openly confront the fundamental principles and norms of international law, which represent the cornerstone of contemporary international relations.” It follows then that Russia’s continued occupation of the separatist territories “poses a direct threat to Georgia’s sovereignty, statehood and represents the most important factor of political, economic and social destabilization.” Therefore, “failure to comply with the international obligations of the ceasefire agreement by the Russian Federation, absence of international peacekeeping forces in the occupied territories, and the increasing militarization of the occupied territories increase the risk of provocations and create a possibility of new military aggression.”

The main aim of the policy of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis Georgia is “to disrupt the realization of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice and to compel Georgia by force to return to Russia’s orbit.” In this conceptual context the ultimate objective of the August 2008 military aggression “was not the occupation of Georgia’s territories or international recognition of the marionette regimes, but the removal of the pro-Western government of Georgia because the Russian ruling political elite considers independent and democratic Georgia a significant threat.” The failure to achieve that overarching objective and the unwillingness of the Russian ruling political elite to reconcile with the status quo “increase the expected threats and risks from Russia.”

The situation in the occupied territories is a significant source of risks. “The lawlessness dominating the occupied territories and the existence of illegally armed and criminal groups of the marionette regimes there negatively affect Georgia’s national security and increase the risk of provocations and incidents, especially in those areas immediately adjacent to the occupation line.”

Another important security challenge is represented by the existence of the conflict zones in Georgia’s neighboring countries. The possibility of spillover from those conflicts into Georgia represents a “challenge to Georgia’s national security” because “the transition of the regional conflicts to a more intensive phase and possible resumption of hostilities, along with other challenges, will cause a humanitarian crisis that will produce large refugee flows and will increase the danger that informal armed formations may enter the country along with the refugees.” Other harmful consequences of such developments also include “the increase in contraband and other types of transnational organized criminal activities” and “the deterioration of the regional security environment,” all of which “will threaten the transportation and energy projects existing in the Caucasus.”

The second part –Foreign policy threats– proclaims outright that the Russian Federation “spends significant resources in the international arena to carry out an anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” with the purpose of “derailing the transformation of Georgia into a state based on Western values.” Thus, the main objective of the aforementioned campaign is “to create the image of Georgia as a non-democratic and unstable state with aggressive aims.” TDA predicts that the Russian Federation “will continue an intensive and widespread anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” in order to “hinder Georgia’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.”

With the purpose of undermining Georgia’s statehood and territorial integrity the Russian government expends considerable political and financial resources on efforts aimed at achieving international recognition of the independence of Georgia’s occupied territories. TDA soberly admits that “despite the fact that the ‘independence’ of these regions was recognized only by Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru, the Russian government continues an active campaign on the international arena to legitimize the occupation of Georgia’s territories and to undermine the international legal status of Georgia’s sovereign territories by recognizing the marionette regimes.”

Equally noteworthy is the emphasis on “the demographic manipulations in the occupied territories,” which are recognized as “containing a threat to Georgia’s national security.” In particular, “the creation of supporting conditions for settling Russian citizens will extend the occupation and significantly complicate the de-occupation process.” In this regard, especially alarming “are those legal steps that are currently taken by the marionette regimes to give residence and private property rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the citizens of other countries” and “construction of so-called military settlements and reconstruction of military infrastructure that will encourage the arrival and settlement of the families of Russian military officials in the occupied territories.”

Georgian national interests are also threatened by the absence of international engagement in the occupied territories. Russia “expends exceptional efforts in order not to allow international engagement in the occupied territories, whereas it is precisely fully-fledged international engagement that represents a significant mechanism for achieving practical results in establishing security and stability in the occupied territories.”

The recap of the remaining parts of the TDA reveals that it is closely modeled on similar programmatic documents of Western countries and most importantly the National Security Strategy of the United States. Part III (Transnational threats) makes mention of the threats posed by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations and transnational criminal entities. This category of threats also includes cyber warfare. In this regard TDA notes that “during the August 2008 war the Russian Federation in parallel with land, air and sea attacks carried out concentrated and massive cyber assault on Georgia,” which demonstrated that “the use of computer technologies to carry out cyber attacks represents a real threat in the globalized world.” The lawlessness in the occupied territories represents another significant transnational security challenge. Among the types of criminal activity there “the illegal transit of components of weapons of mass destruction, illegal trade in weapons and narcotics, production and distribution of counterfeit currency, and human trafficking” pose particularly grave risks.

Finally, Part IV (Socio-economic threats) mainly discusses the threats to Georgia’s sustainable economic development posed by the global financial crisis, while Part V (Natural and technogenic threats and challenges) focuses on examining the ecologically dangerous developments in the occupied territories, challenges posed by Georgia’s location in the seismically active zone and such technogenic risks as chemical spills, accidents at hydroelectric power facilities, and emergencies on main pipelines.

French Foreign Minister's Interesting Interview with Ekho Moskvy

On Thursday, October 1, 2009, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner gave a wide-ranging interview to the radio host and astute observer Aleksei Venediktov from Russia's only remaining opposition-minded radio station Ekho Moskvy. [See photo on the left. Courtesy of Natalia Zhukova, Radio Ekho Moskvy.] It should be noted that the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner and French Defense Minister Herve Morin were in Moscow last week to meet with their Russian counterparts in the 2+2 format. As it turns out, the meeting agenda included the discussions regarding the possibility of Russia's purchase of the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier. What follows is the verbatim English translation of the excerpts from the interview transcript posted on the website of the Ekho Moskvy:

On the Russia-Georgia war of 2008:

A. Venediktov: You mentioned sanctions. A year ago, when there was a war between Russia and Georgia, you also spoke of possible sanctions. At the time you did not exclude the possibility of sanctions against Russia. I am asking you the question now. Has your position to this war and its consequences in Russia and Georgia changed, Mr. Minister?

B. Kushner: Well, hold on...You constantly...

A. Venediktov: Indeed it was you, who spoke of sanctions!

B. Kushner: No, I speak of peace. I said three times: 'Peace, peace, peace!' Chances are...when the confrontation is approaching and then there are very few means to...[inaudible] that confrontation. That's the possibility of war. And we do not want it.

A. Venediktov: Nonetheless, the European Council issued the report on the war between Russia and Georgia. Our radio listeners are asking, you personally, Mr. Kushner, who was one of the actors in the creation of the post-war system...

B. Kushner: I am a professional actor.

A. Venediktov: I agree. Tell me, please, do you think the situation between Russia and Georgia is a dead end? Everything is frozen and will remain as is.

B. Kushner: I hope not. By the way, the French, European Union does everything in order to avoid the dead end. So I am returning to your first question. There is a report, but I do not have it with me. I am very careful in my phrases here because I need to familiarize myself with the details of that report. From what I read though, in the report it is written that Mr. Saakashvili started the war in Tskhinvali on the night of August 8. Almost immediately I, as you know, and President Sarkozy arrived in Moscow and then met in Georgia.

It was August 10 and the Russian troops were approaching Tbilisi. I did not see it myself, what the devastation was in Tskhinvali. Then I saw that there were bombings at night, there was a night bombing. We cannot claim that. And without a doubt these hostilities led to [inaudible]. After that there were many provocations from both sides. Between these two populations, who used to reside together. It is a valley and only about 200 meters separate the neighbors. And mountains are within about 3 kilometers. It is a very small distance. Between the South Ossetia and the towns of Georgia, which are nearby, within several kilometers.

The tanks were already in Gori, where the great Stalin was born. Still I find it somewhat strange. The separation. Stalin drew that map in such a manner so as to avoid a confrontation. Thus, there were mutliple provocations, they began to bomb the city, then the troops showed up. I think we need to condemn both. And the problem of borders in Europe should not be resolved by the use of force. I think not just in Europe but in the whole world. We shall study this report very carefully. I do not know if this was a lack of success, failure. But I think France at the time presided over the European Union and it undertook diplomatic efforts.

That is why now I come here and will be discussing issues with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs and the president. There were changes in the French diplomacy. Can we consider that we achieved some success? I do not know. We slowed down the possible consequences. I think there were chances that the Russians could go to Tbilisi. I do not know whether or not this problem is solved. But in the end there are negotiations under way in Geneva. It is important that they continue. These are very important meetings. Everyone is meeting in Geneva. I hope that the solution will be found in the end. Since then we have not recognized either Ossetia or Abkhazia. Only two countries did - Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Please, consider the influence of this decision.

A.Venediktov: Mr. Minister, do you think the Russian side thoroughly fulfilled the Sarkozy-Medvedev plan?

B. Kushner: No, no, no.

A. Venediktov: What's left?

B. Kushner: In particular, the European observers, who were in the zone and with whom we talked and told that every detail was important. From my point of view, I think it is important to start and to calm things down somehow, I understand that the borders are not suitable for Russia and I know under what conditions they were drawn. That was the moment when Gorbachev and Yeltsin were in power. That was not my fault. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of Communists, that was not our fault. Already back then the situation was not so great. At some point this needs to be resolved. Let's start with keeping there the European observers, there are three hundred of them there. We managed to gather them in fifteen days and they represent all countries of Europe. These observers should be on the both sides of the border because it is necessary.

And in particular, in Ossetia. And you know the distance there is literally within two steps. We do not want to provoke the war. This is the force of peace and monitoring.

A. Venediktov: Mr. Minister, some of your compatriots and your Georgian compatriots talk about the fact that when it comes to issues related to Georgia, Sarkozy resembles Daladier and that this is the new Munich of 1938, when France surrendered Georgia as at the time Daladier surrendered Czechoslovakia. How do you like this comparison?

B. Kushner: Well, you know, if we talk about Munich, well...I think this was invoked many times before about the similar situations. No, I remember, I recall very clearly. I was not born then, but Munich was a completely different situation. And England and France backed away under the pressure of Nazism. Of course, that's not at all what we have here. After all, I want to emphasize here that the Americans were nowhere to be seen. It is convenient to dispense advice that it is important to display strength and courage from afar. But we did it with own hands with President Sarkozy to end the war.

And in this regard Russia participated, fulfilled the agreement, which we signed on paper here, in Moscow and then later in Tbilisi. After that Ms. Condoleezza Rice, who was still the foreign minister then, as you know, wrote the letter saying that this was absolutely unsatisfactory. The Russian troops occupied territories, which were not theirs and they stayed on those territories. I will tell you the following. I am proud that I went to the North Ossetia and that I visited refugees there. Nobody wanted me to go there and I was told I had no right and everyone wanted to force me not to go there, both Russians and Georgians.

And then I met with the refugees. I spent 2-3 hours with them. And these poor people were desperate, there were, of course, casualties, they were in the utter despair. There were refugees on the other side as well. But this is not a unilateral decision. We cannot resolve this on our continent with war.

On the possibility of selling the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier to Russia:

A. Venediktov: Lately there is much talk about the military-technical cooperation between France and Russia. In particular, the French military are interested in the helicopter carrier Mistral. Does the French government support Russia in its willingness to buy the French equipment and in particular Mistral?

B. Kushner: You are right. It's good that you mentioned the military-technical cooperation. This is also a political cooperation. We meet with the defense and foreign affairs ministers sometimes in Paris and sometimes in Moscow. You understand that we trust each other. By the way, Mr. Medvedev will meet us today. In particular, the negotiations are technical. Mistral is a great vessel, very functional. There is a certain political procedure involved here and it is important for that procedure to be fulfilled. It is important to fulfill it in order to achieve a political agreement. If this political agreement is reached, since I do not decide, but I think that there is a representative from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who deals with that, then I hope you will be able to acquire this wonderful Mistral.

What I want to say is that France wants to develop the European defense policy. But at the same time we would like to have a certain area, a zone of joint defense, joint security...

A. Venediktov: Without the U.S.A?

B. Kushner: No. No. Of course, U.S.A. could be there as well, but Medvedev's proposal is as follows. He spoke of the zone of European security, I think he spoke of it in Kaliningrad. We said: 'Yes.' But where are the proposals? Thus far they are being discussed in diplomatic circles, after the conference at the OSCE, precisely at the OSCE. Of course, that's the only organization, where there are Americans, Europeans and Russians. And we ought to talk through this organization. We are ready to talk about it. We want to see the zone of the European countries plus Balkans and if they want to join, I welcome it.

And there will be another zone with our Russian friends, which will be the zone of security.

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Instant commentariat:

Regardless of how bad (or good) was the quality of the simultaneous French-to-Russian interpreter, who was attending the interview, it is still possible to draw some raw observations regarding specific points raised above:

• The French Foreign Minister displays a remarkable lack of knowledge of the most basic facts about the conflict in South Ossetia.
• He admits that the there was a possibility that the Russians could have entered Tbilisi.
• He is still bitter about the fact that Americans showed no leadership throughout the hottest phase of the confrontation last August.
• He still considers himself a great humanitarian for participating in photo ops with the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from South Ossetia in Georgia and refugees in North Ossetia.
  
• He carelessly acknowledges that the Russo-French negotiations over the Mistral deal are advanced (see "technical" above) and by "a certain political procedure" he most likely means the inconvenient requirement to obtain the green light from Washington since nothing that contains U.S.-manufactured defense-related component (and Mistral undoubtedly contains quite a few of those) can be sold to or patented out to another country without an approval, which is likely to be a very time-consuming endeavor.
• He vaguely outlines possible tenets of French view on European defense policy, which apparently entails an area of joint defense and/or security with Russia.