In a Reversal, Obama Administration Pressures Georgia on Russia's WTO Accession

Despite the repeated public statements underscoring the Obama administration's commitment to the principle of non-interference in the on-going Russian-Georgian negotiations regarding Russia's WTO accession, it turns out that Washington tried to pressure Tbilisi at least on one occasion quite recently.

The Cable writes that, according to "a senior GOP Senate aide," U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk [see photo on the right courtesy of LegalInfo360.com], "while briefing senators before a recent congressional trip that included a stop in Georgia, asked those senators to pressure Georgia to move toward acceptance of Russia's membership in the WTO." Moreover, according to the aforementioned senior aide, "It was odd to hear Ambassador Kirk behind closed doors urging a group of senators to pressure Georgia to 'be reasonable' while, we understood, the administration was saying publicly it would stay out of a Georgia-Russia issue."

Survey of the relevant news reports in the Georgian media over the past couple of months allows one to conclude that the group of senators briefed by Ambassador Kirk included Republican senators Jon Kyl, Mike Crapo, Ron Johnson, and Jeff Sessions. According to Civil.ge, the U.S. senators met with the Georgian government officials in Tbilisi on April 18, as part of their five-country tour, which also included Ukraine and three Baltic states.

It should be recalled that previously the Obama administration officials emphatically insisted that they have no intention of mediating the Russian-Georgian talks or forcing the Georgian side to achieve the agreement with Russians. In early March, the Senior Director for Russia at the National Security Council, Michael McFaul, who has been recently nominated to become the next U.S. Ambassador to Russia, told The Cable: "There are definitely issues remaining between Russia and Georgia regarding trade relations that have to be addressed. There is a process underway. I don't want to prejudge it because we're not involved in it." Furthermore, according to The Cable: "McFaul was firm that the United States would not insert itself into the effort to help Russia and Georgia come to an agreement on the issue. 'We're not going to do that,' he said. At the end of the day this is a bilateral issue, not a trilateral issue.'"

Similar sentiments were expressed by another senior administration official to The Cable in late October of last year: "This is a bilateral issue between Russia and Georgia, this is not a trilateral issue that we are supposed to solve somehow." The same senior administration official clarified that the Obama administration had no intention of exerting influence on Georgia on this issue and that Washington would not offer incentives or disincentives to Tbilisi.

However, the news coverage accompanying the meeting of U.S. and Russian presidents on the sidelines of the G8 summit in France on May 26 suddenly revealed completely different picture. Not only much of the meeting was devoted to the discussion of the Russia's WTO accession, but also, according to a senior administration official, President Barack Obama has been personally engaged with this issue for months. In particular, the official told the ABC News that apparently President Obama came up with the idea of Switzerland acting as an honest broker between Russia and Georgia with regard to Russia's WTO accession-related negotiations. It turns out that President Obama secured President Medvedev's agreement regarding Russia's participation in Swiss-mediated talks with Georgia in November on the sidelines of the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization in Yokohama, Japan, whereas President Saakashvili acquiesced at the NATO summit in Lisbon the same month.

The fact that the U.S. Trade Representative tried to convince some Republican senators to pressure the Georgian government to compromise with Russia suggests that the Obama administration reversed its position on this issue. Given the central importance of Russia's WTO accession for the continuation of the seemingly stalled "reset" policy, this reversal should not come as a surprise. It will remain to be seen what outcome this tacit pressure will produce.

Although the Georgian side is often falsely accused of politicizing the Swiss-brokered negotiations both in Russian and Western media, Tbilisi's demands have actually nothing to do with the insistence on the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia's demands remain unchanged and they include the fulfillment by the Russian side of the obligations included in the 2004 bilateral accession protocol and the resolution of the custom administration issues along the Russian-Georgian border. None of these are insurmountable. With the modicum of good will and some creativity they can be resolved in a manner acceptable to both parties. For instance, the customs regime on the Abkhazian and South Ossetian sections of the Russian-Georgian border can be administered by the third party on Georgia's behalf (view advocated by Damon Wilson, Director of the International Security Program at the Atlantic Council) akin to the arrangement currently in place on the de facto borders of Moldova's separatist enclave of Transdnistria, which is carried out by the European Union. However, considering the attitudes prevailing in the Kremlin at present it is probably highly unrealistic to expect any sign of flexibility from the Russians on these issues. Meanwhile the next round of the Swiss-mediated Russian-Georgian talks, which was originally scheduled to start on June 2, has been postponed for "technical reasons" at the request of the Swiss government.

Georgia's New Threat Assessment Document Identifies Russia as a Main Threat

NOTE: This article was published in the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor today.

On September 2, 2010, the Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, signed Order No.707, which approved the adoption of the Georgia’s Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013. In accordance with Article 61 of Georgia’s General Administrative Code, the aforementioned document replaced the previous Threat Assessment Document for 2007-2009, which was adopted by the Presidential Order No.542 on September 24, 2007. The examination of the unclassified 7-page portion of the new threat assessment document provides unique insights into the global, regional and local threat perception of the current Georgian government.

According to the Preamble, “the Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013 [hereafter referred to as TDA] represents the fundamental conceptual document that identifies the threats facing Georgia and analyzes the scenarios of their possible development, their likelihoods and results.

TDA is based on the broad understanding of security that entails not only the assessment of the military-political threats but also of the socio-economic and terrorist threats as well as natural and technogenic catastrophes. The understanding of the aforementioned threats is necessary for the proper execution of government policy aimed at neutralizing the threats facing Georgia."

TDA is divided into the following five parts: I. Military threats, II. Foreign policy threats, III. Transnational threats, IV. Socio-economic threats, and V. Natural and technogenic threats and challenges.

The first part –Military threats– opens with the doctrinal statement that rules out the conduct of foreign affairs based on the politics of force as “posing a threat to the fundamental principles and norms of the global community.” Furthermore, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and subsequent Russian occupation of Georgia’s breakaway regions “made it clear that for the sake of its narrow interests the Russian Federation is willing to openly confront the fundamental principles and norms of international law, which represent the cornerstone of contemporary international relations.” It follows then that Russia’s continued occupation of the separatist territories “poses a direct threat to Georgia’s sovereignty, statehood and represents the most important factor of political, economic and social destabilization.” Therefore, “failure to comply with the international obligations of the ceasefire agreement by the Russian Federation, absence of international peacekeeping forces in the occupied territories, and the increasing militarization of the occupied territories increase the risk of provocations and create a possibility of new military aggression.”

The main aim of the policy of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis Georgia is “to disrupt the realization of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice and to compel Georgia by force to return to Russia’s orbit.” In this conceptual context the ultimate objective of the August 2008 military aggression “was not the occupation of Georgia’s territories or international recognition of the marionette regimes, but the removal of the pro-Western government of Georgia because the Russian ruling political elite considers independent and democratic Georgia a significant threat.” The failure to achieve that overarching objective and the unwillingness of the Russian ruling political elite to reconcile with the status quo “increase the expected threats and risks from Russia.”

The situation in the occupied territories is a significant source of risks. “The lawlessness dominating the occupied territories and the existence of illegally armed and criminal groups of the marionette regimes there negatively affect Georgia’s national security and increase the risk of provocations and incidents, especially in those areas immediately adjacent to the occupation line.”

Another important security challenge is represented by the existence of the conflict zones in Georgia’s neighboring countries. The possibility of spillover from those conflicts into Georgia represents a “challenge to Georgia’s national security” because “the transition of the regional conflicts to a more intensive phase and possible resumption of hostilities, along with other challenges, will cause a humanitarian crisis that will produce large refugee flows and will increase the danger that informal armed formations may enter the country along with the refugees.” Other harmful consequences of such developments also include “the increase in contraband and other types of transnational organized criminal activities” and “the deterioration of the regional security environment,” all of which “will threaten the transportation and energy projects existing in the Caucasus.”

The second part –Foreign policy threats– proclaims outright that the Russian Federation “spends significant resources in the international arena to carry out an anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” with the purpose of “derailing the transformation of Georgia into a state based on Western values.” Thus, the main objective of the aforementioned campaign is “to create the image of Georgia as a non-democratic and unstable state with aggressive aims.” TDA predicts that the Russian Federation “will continue an intensive and widespread anti-Georgian information and diplomatic campaign” in order to “hinder Georgia’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.”

With the purpose of undermining Georgia’s statehood and territorial integrity the Russian government expends considerable political and financial resources on efforts aimed at achieving international recognition of the independence of Georgia’s occupied territories. TDA soberly admits that “despite the fact that the ‘independence’ of these regions was recognized only by Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru, the Russian government continues an active campaign on the international arena to legitimize the occupation of Georgia’s territories and to undermine the international legal status of Georgia’s sovereign territories by recognizing the marionette regimes.”

Equally noteworthy is the emphasis on “the demographic manipulations in the occupied territories,” which are recognized as “containing a threat to Georgia’s national security.” In particular, “the creation of supporting conditions for settling Russian citizens will extend the occupation and significantly complicate the de-occupation process.” In this regard, especially alarming “are those legal steps that are currently taken by the marionette regimes to give residence and private property rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the citizens of other countries” and “construction of so-called military settlements and reconstruction of military infrastructure that will encourage the arrival and settlement of the families of Russian military officials in the occupied territories.”

Georgian national interests are also threatened by the absence of international engagement in the occupied territories. Russia “expends exceptional efforts in order not to allow international engagement in the occupied territories, whereas it is precisely fully-fledged international engagement that represents a significant mechanism for achieving practical results in establishing security and stability in the occupied territories.”

The recap of the remaining parts of the TDA reveals that it is closely modeled on similar programmatic documents of Western countries and most importantly the National Security Strategy of the United States. Part III (Transnational threats) makes mention of the threats posed by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations and transnational criminal entities. This category of threats also includes cyber warfare. In this regard TDA notes that “during the August 2008 war the Russian Federation in parallel with land, air and sea attacks carried out concentrated and massive cyber assault on Georgia,” which demonstrated that “the use of computer technologies to carry out cyber attacks represents a real threat in the globalized world.” The lawlessness in the occupied territories represents another significant transnational security challenge. Among the types of criminal activity there “the illegal transit of components of weapons of mass destruction, illegal trade in weapons and narcotics, production and distribution of counterfeit currency, and human trafficking” pose particularly grave risks.

Finally, Part IV (Socio-economic threats) mainly discusses the threats to Georgia’s sustainable economic development posed by the global financial crisis, while Part V (Natural and technogenic threats and challenges) focuses on examining the ecologically dangerous developments in the occupied territories, challenges posed by Georgia’s location in the seismically active zone and such technogenic risks as chemical spills, accidents at hydroelectric power facilities, and emergencies on main pipelines.

The Article on the Atlantic Council's Website is Redacted after a Major Faux Pas

On Tuesday, June 8, 2010, the article entitled "Georgia Drifts Away from the West" by Matthew Czekaj, a research associate with the Atlantic Council's International Security Program, appeared on the New Atlanticist Policy and Analysis Blog of the Atlantic Council. It was an undoubtedly interesting read because it dealt with the uncomfortable subject of tensions in the U.S.-Georgian relationship, which are at least in part caused by Tbilisi's recent overtures towards Tehran. Particularly compelling was the following passage:

In an effort to extenuate the Georgian-Iranian partnership, Tbilisi was quick to declare that the relationship with Teheran would be strictly economic, and would not extend into closer political or foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Georgia claimed that it had personally discussed its strategy for Iran with the United States, and thus no one should be surprised by this partnership agreement. Yet, Tbilisi's assertions are highly dubious.

In fact, according to an Atlantic Council source in the National Security Council, the Georgians never approached the United States government regarding Iran. If they had, Saakashvili would not have so ecstatically endorsed the Turkish-Brazilian plan for reprocessing of Iranian nuclear fuel on May 18.

The highlighted portion above was especially intriguing because it directly suggested that some members of the Obama administration's hypertrophied National Security Council were definitely displeased by the Georgian government's initiatives vis-a-vis Iran. Several days later the article disappeared from the Atlantic Council's website altogether. Clicking the hyperlink only gave an automatic message saying that the page was missing. Then the article reappeared with the Editor's note, which states as follows: "This is an edited version of a previous copy of this article, which contained a factual error." The "edited" version of the passage above, which you can find here, reads as follows:

In an effort to extenuate the Georgian-Iranian partnership, Tbilisi was quick to declare that the relationship with Teheran would be strictly economic, and would not extend into closer political or foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Georgia claims that it has discussed its strategy for Iran with the United States, and thus no one should be surprised by this sudden outreach.

Yet, Saakashvili’s diplomacy seems very much out of step with the United States, having, endorsed the Turkish-Brazilian plan for reprocessing of Iranian nuclear fuel.

As can be clearly seen by the comparison of these two passages, the mention of the NSC source is omitted entirely. One can only surmise that apparently the mention of the NSC staff in such a sensitive context was deemed important enough to necessitate this redaction.

French Foreign Minister's Interesting Interview with Ekho Moskvy

On Thursday, October 1, 2009, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner gave a wide-ranging interview to the radio host and astute observer Aleksei Venediktov from Russia's only remaining opposition-minded radio station Ekho Moskvy. [See photo on the left. Courtesy of Natalia Zhukova, Radio Ekho Moskvy.] It should be noted that the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner and French Defense Minister Herve Morin were in Moscow last week to meet with their Russian counterparts in the 2+2 format. As it turns out, the meeting agenda included the discussions regarding the possibility of Russia's purchase of the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier. What follows is the verbatim English translation of the excerpts from the interview transcript posted on the website of the Ekho Moskvy:

On the Russia-Georgia war of 2008:

A. Venediktov: You mentioned sanctions. A year ago, when there was a war between Russia and Georgia, you also spoke of possible sanctions. At the time you did not exclude the possibility of sanctions against Russia. I am asking you the question now. Has your position to this war and its consequences in Russia and Georgia changed, Mr. Minister?

B. Kushner: Well, hold on...You constantly...

A. Venediktov: Indeed it was you, who spoke of sanctions!

B. Kushner: No, I speak of peace. I said three times: 'Peace, peace, peace!' Chances are...when the confrontation is approaching and then there are very few means to...[inaudible] that confrontation. That's the possibility of war. And we do not want it.

A. Venediktov: Nonetheless, the European Council issued the report on the war between Russia and Georgia. Our radio listeners are asking, you personally, Mr. Kushner, who was one of the actors in the creation of the post-war system...

B. Kushner: I am a professional actor.

A. Venediktov: I agree. Tell me, please, do you think the situation between Russia and Georgia is a dead end? Everything is frozen and will remain as is.

B. Kushner: I hope not. By the way, the French, European Union does everything in order to avoid the dead end. So I am returning to your first question. There is a report, but I do not have it with me. I am very careful in my phrases here because I need to familiarize myself with the details of that report. From what I read though, in the report it is written that Mr. Saakashvili started the war in Tskhinvali on the night of August 8. Almost immediately I, as you know, and President Sarkozy arrived in Moscow and then met in Georgia.

It was August 10 and the Russian troops were approaching Tbilisi. I did not see it myself, what the devastation was in Tskhinvali. Then I saw that there were bombings at night, there was a night bombing. We cannot claim that. And without a doubt these hostilities led to [inaudible]. After that there were many provocations from both sides. Between these two populations, who used to reside together. It is a valley and only about 200 meters separate the neighbors. And mountains are within about 3 kilometers. It is a very small distance. Between the South Ossetia and the towns of Georgia, which are nearby, within several kilometers.

The tanks were already in Gori, where the great Stalin was born. Still I find it somewhat strange. The separation. Stalin drew that map in such a manner so as to avoid a confrontation. Thus, there were mutliple provocations, they began to bomb the city, then the troops showed up. I think we need to condemn both. And the problem of borders in Europe should not be resolved by the use of force. I think not just in Europe but in the whole world. We shall study this report very carefully. I do not know if this was a lack of success, failure. But I think France at the time presided over the European Union and it undertook diplomatic efforts.

That is why now I come here and will be discussing issues with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs and the president. There were changes in the French diplomacy. Can we consider that we achieved some success? I do not know. We slowed down the possible consequences. I think there were chances that the Russians could go to Tbilisi. I do not know whether or not this problem is solved. But in the end there are negotiations under way in Geneva. It is important that they continue. These are very important meetings. Everyone is meeting in Geneva. I hope that the solution will be found in the end. Since then we have not recognized either Ossetia or Abkhazia. Only two countries did - Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Please, consider the influence of this decision.

A.Venediktov: Mr. Minister, do you think the Russian side thoroughly fulfilled the Sarkozy-Medvedev plan?

B. Kushner: No, no, no.

A. Venediktov: What's left?

B. Kushner: In particular, the European observers, who were in the zone and with whom we talked and told that every detail was important. From my point of view, I think it is important to start and to calm things down somehow, I understand that the borders are not suitable for Russia and I know under what conditions they were drawn. That was the moment when Gorbachev and Yeltsin were in power. That was not my fault. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of Communists, that was not our fault. Already back then the situation was not so great. At some point this needs to be resolved. Let's start with keeping there the European observers, there are three hundred of them there. We managed to gather them in fifteen days and they represent all countries of Europe. These observers should be on the both sides of the border because it is necessary.

And in particular, in Ossetia. And you know the distance there is literally within two steps. We do not want to provoke the war. This is the force of peace and monitoring.

A. Venediktov: Mr. Minister, some of your compatriots and your Georgian compatriots talk about the fact that when it comes to issues related to Georgia, Sarkozy resembles Daladier and that this is the new Munich of 1938, when France surrendered Georgia as at the time Daladier surrendered Czechoslovakia. How do you like this comparison?

B. Kushner: Well, you know, if we talk about Munich, well...I think this was invoked many times before about the similar situations. No, I remember, I recall very clearly. I was not born then, but Munich was a completely different situation. And England and France backed away under the pressure of Nazism. Of course, that's not at all what we have here. After all, I want to emphasize here that the Americans were nowhere to be seen. It is convenient to dispense advice that it is important to display strength and courage from afar. But we did it with own hands with President Sarkozy to end the war.

And in this regard Russia participated, fulfilled the agreement, which we signed on paper here, in Moscow and then later in Tbilisi. After that Ms. Condoleezza Rice, who was still the foreign minister then, as you know, wrote the letter saying that this was absolutely unsatisfactory. The Russian troops occupied territories, which were not theirs and they stayed on those territories. I will tell you the following. I am proud that I went to the North Ossetia and that I visited refugees there. Nobody wanted me to go there and I was told I had no right and everyone wanted to force me not to go there, both Russians and Georgians.

And then I met with the refugees. I spent 2-3 hours with them. And these poor people were desperate, there were, of course, casualties, they were in the utter despair. There were refugees on the other side as well. But this is not a unilateral decision. We cannot resolve this on our continent with war.

On the possibility of selling the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier to Russia:

A. Venediktov: Lately there is much talk about the military-technical cooperation between France and Russia. In particular, the French military are interested in the helicopter carrier Mistral. Does the French government support Russia in its willingness to buy the French equipment and in particular Mistral?

B. Kushner: You are right. It's good that you mentioned the military-technical cooperation. This is also a political cooperation. We meet with the defense and foreign affairs ministers sometimes in Paris and sometimes in Moscow. You understand that we trust each other. By the way, Mr. Medvedev will meet us today. In particular, the negotiations are technical. Mistral is a great vessel, very functional. There is a certain political procedure involved here and it is important for that procedure to be fulfilled. It is important to fulfill it in order to achieve a political agreement. If this political agreement is reached, since I do not decide, but I think that there is a representative from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who deals with that, then I hope you will be able to acquire this wonderful Mistral.

What I want to say is that France wants to develop the European defense policy. But at the same time we would like to have a certain area, a zone of joint defense, joint security...

A. Venediktov: Without the U.S.A?

B. Kushner: No. No. Of course, U.S.A. could be there as well, but Medvedev's proposal is as follows. He spoke of the zone of European security, I think he spoke of it in Kaliningrad. We said: 'Yes.' But where are the proposals? Thus far they are being discussed in diplomatic circles, after the conference at the OSCE, precisely at the OSCE. Of course, that's the only organization, where there are Americans, Europeans and Russians. And we ought to talk through this organization. We are ready to talk about it. We want to see the zone of the European countries plus Balkans and if they want to join, I welcome it.

And there will be another zone with our Russian friends, which will be the zone of security.

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Instant commentariat:

Regardless of how bad (or good) was the quality of the simultaneous French-to-Russian interpreter, who was attending the interview, it is still possible to draw some raw observations regarding specific points raised above:

• The French Foreign Minister displays a remarkable lack of knowledge of the most basic facts about the conflict in South Ossetia.
• He admits that the there was a possibility that the Russians could have entered Tbilisi.
• He is still bitter about the fact that Americans showed no leadership throughout the hottest phase of the confrontation last August.
• He still considers himself a great humanitarian for participating in photo ops with the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from South Ossetia in Georgia and refugees in North Ossetia.
  
• He carelessly acknowledges that the Russo-French negotiations over the Mistral deal are advanced (see "technical" above) and by "a certain political procedure" he most likely means the inconvenient requirement to obtain the green light from Washington since nothing that contains U.S.-manufactured defense-related component (and Mistral undoubtedly contains quite a few of those) can be sold to or patented out to another country without an approval, which is likely to be a very time-consuming endeavor.
• He vaguely outlines possible tenets of French view on European defense policy, which apparently entails an area of joint defense and/or security with Russia.