Response to Oliver Bullough

On February 14, 2011, the Georgian news portal Georgiandaily.com published my response to Oliver Bullough [see photo on the right courtesy of circassianworld.com], whose article "Letter From Tbilisi: Toward a United Caucasus. A New Georgian Gamble in the Caucasus?" appeared on the website of the Foreign Affairs magazine on December 23, 2010. I am reposting it here in its entirety:

Response to Oliver Bullough

February 14, 2011

by Alexander Melikishvili, Freelance Research Analyst

Judging by the very appearance of Oliver Bullough’s vastly simplistic and transparently biased interpretation of Georgia’s recently launched array of policy initiatives vis-à-vis the North Caucasus (“Letter From Tbilisi: Toward a United Caucasus,” Foreign Affairs, December 23, 2010), the quality standards at the Foreign Affairs sadly continue to disappoint.

For many centuries now the volatile areas around the world have a habit of attracting rather diverse mix of thrill-seeking adventurers of all kinds and walks of life. In recent centuries this set of colorful characters ranged from Alexandre Dumas and Lev Nussimbaum to Sir John Chardin and Odette Keun. Of course, mentioning Bullough in this company is undoubtedly giving him too much credit, but these are difficult times that probably merit certain leniency as well as charity.

Bored with the Welsh Marches, in comes this self-styled “Rory Stewart” of the Caucasus, who is clearly convinced that he is qualified not only to admonish the Georgian government for its “provocative and potentially destabilizing” overtures towards the North Caucasus but also to urge the West and more specifically the Obama administration to do something about it. Curious indeed. However, let us proceed in examining the most problematic aspects of his essay in an orderly manner.

The reiteration of fallacies should begin with the often heard Russian complaint of Georgia’s alleged “betrayal” of its former imperial master. Apparently Bullough is highly susceptible to the Russian interpretation of the historical events, including the fateful signing of the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783, which is conveniently presented as the selfless, humane and noble deed and not as anchoring of imperial ambitions and interests in the Caucasus that lasted in one form or another to the present day.

Bullough is obviously unaware of the fact that the Russian Empire subsequently violated the terms of the aforementioned treaty by disrupting the Georgian monarchic line, co-opting the oversized and fractious Georgian aristocracy and systematically destroying any vestiges of Georgian sovereignty symbolic or otherwise. In other words, Georgia became another territorial acquisition in the seemingly relentless expansion of the Russian Empire by land. Paradoxically by then Georgian statehood withstood multiple Muslim yokes and yet it was the “fellow Christians” from the north, who put an end to it. Under the Russian imperial rule Georgians distinguished themselves by serving Tsars with erstwhile zeal and exceptional loyalty. The equestrian statue of Georgian Prince and General of Russian Army Pyotr Bagration(i) that still stands in downtown Moscow ought to be an adequate reminder of this service. However, the collapse of the Russian Empire drastically changed the geopolitical circumstances surrounding Georgia and if it were not for the Bolshevik reoccupation and subsequent seven decades of servitude under the Soviet rule who knows where Georgia’s westward reorientation would have led? Bullough simply fails to comprehend that Georgia’s yearning for Euro-Atlantic integration is not some sort of bizarre idée fixe of the current Georgian government but it reflects genuinely broad national consensus.

However, the weakest point of Bullough’s argument is in simplistically interpreting Georgian government’s decision to introduce a visa-free regime for the residents of the North Caucasus as yet another example of Tbilisi’s thoughtless poking of the Russian bear. As I already wrote elsewhere, in simplifying travel procedures for the North Caucasians Tbilisi primarily seeks to cultivate the good will towards Georgia among them. The same purpose is served by the growing educational exchanges as well as by the relaunch in January of the First Caucasus News television channel, which is run by the veteran British journalist Robert Parsons.

The mentioning of Georgian natural gas imports from Iran is clearly intended to fuel Western suspicions about Georgian government’s regional policy, as the Georgian analyst David Iberi aptly notes in his criticism of Bullough’s piece here. In his monumental ignorance Bullough fails to mention that Iran is, by far, not the most vital source of natural gas for Georgia. Georgia receives the bulk of its natural gas from the neighboring Azerbaijan. If he were to do some most basic fact-checking before writing his screed, Bullough would have also discovered that NATO member Turkey last year increased its gas imports from Iran by 50 percent.

What is also striking about Bullough’s piece is that the author completely neglects to mention the systematic manner in which the Russian government alienated the population of the North Caucasus. Amidst the rising xenophobia targeting the dark-skinned “people of Caucasian nationality” in Russia proper, the North Caucasians have long become the second class citizens of the Russian Federation. So much so that after the introduction of the visa-free travel to Georgia a joke took root among the North Caucasians that at least now the anachronistic propiska or record of place of residence stamped in the Russian passport finally offers distinct advantage of visa-free travel to Georgia as opposed to many disadvantages and discrimination that a holder of such passport would experience once he or she ventures into the Russia proper.

Another sign of intellectual dishonesty is evident in the omission of the conferral of the Russian citizenship en masse on the residents of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which violated the international law, as is duly noted in the EU-sponsored report on the August 2008 war.

In a typical zero-sum fashion Bullough makes rather provocative claim that any expansion of Georgia’s influence over the North Caucasus will invariably result in the weakening of Russia’s grip over this volatile region, which, he asserts, could result in ethnic conflicts there with all the consequences for the “outside powers.” What he forgets is that the Kremlin’s hold on the North Caucasus has always been rather tenuous. The policy of installing Putin loyalists and hoping that they will somehow manage the local affairs has proven to be disastrously misguided and ineffective. The widespread corruption, police brutality, rising unemployment and near total neglect from the federal center in Moscow created fertile conditions in which the insurgency that was once primarily circumscribed to Chechnya has now spread to the other North Caucasian republics. It is hard to imagine that Tbilisi’s peaceful “soft power” initiatives would make matters worse there and yet Bullough seems to be adamant about such doom and gloom scenarios. After the most recent attack on the Domodedovo Airport, Russians are more openly asking the questions about what they received in terms of basic security after more than ten years of Putinism.

Bullough contradicts himself when he grudgingly recognizes that Tbilisi is gradually restoring the status of the cultural and economic capital of the Caucasus region (both North and South) that it once held while at the same time resisting and even fearing this process.

Finally, Bullough naively overestimates the influence Washington now wields over Tbilisi. With the new round of Iran sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council and the new START treaty signed and ratified, the “reset” with Russia must now be propelled by Russia’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Here, however, Georgia suddenly finds itself in possession of a unique leverage because the WTO membership can only be granted by the unanimous consent of all member-states. Georgia is a WTO member and for a number of legitimate reasons, including the unilateral Russian trade embargo imposed on Georgia since 2006, Tbilisi has shown no willingness to give a green light thus far. Thus, if Russia were to enter the WTO in 2011, as per President Barack Obama’s personal promise to President Dmitri Medvedev, Tbilisi would have to be offered something significant in return. What that might be is anybody’s guess and there are those, who speculate that Tbilisi might demand defensive weapons from the West, but be that as it may, clearly Tbilisi is in a better negotiating position than Washington. In this context, certainly Washington will be less likely to dictate anything to Tbilisi, especially when it comes to Georgia’s policy vis-à-vis North Caucasus, which is poorly understood here anyway.

The Article on the Atlantic Council's Website is Redacted after a Major Faux Pas

On Tuesday, June 8, 2010, the article entitled "Georgia Drifts Away from the West" by Matthew Czekaj, a research associate with the Atlantic Council's International Security Program, appeared on the New Atlanticist Policy and Analysis Blog of the Atlantic Council. It was an undoubtedly interesting read because it dealt with the uncomfortable subject of tensions in the U.S.-Georgian relationship, which are at least in part caused by Tbilisi's recent overtures towards Tehran. Particularly compelling was the following passage:

In an effort to extenuate the Georgian-Iranian partnership, Tbilisi was quick to declare that the relationship with Teheran would be strictly economic, and would not extend into closer political or foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Georgia claimed that it had personally discussed its strategy for Iran with the United States, and thus no one should be surprised by this partnership agreement. Yet, Tbilisi's assertions are highly dubious.

In fact, according to an Atlantic Council source in the National Security Council, the Georgians never approached the United States government regarding Iran. If they had, Saakashvili would not have so ecstatically endorsed the Turkish-Brazilian plan for reprocessing of Iranian nuclear fuel on May 18.

The highlighted portion above was especially intriguing because it directly suggested that some members of the Obama administration's hypertrophied National Security Council were definitely displeased by the Georgian government's initiatives vis-a-vis Iran. Several days later the article disappeared from the Atlantic Council's website altogether. Clicking the hyperlink only gave an automatic message saying that the page was missing. Then the article reappeared with the Editor's note, which states as follows: "This is an edited version of a previous copy of this article, which contained a factual error." The "edited" version of the passage above, which you can find here, reads as follows:

In an effort to extenuate the Georgian-Iranian partnership, Tbilisi was quick to declare that the relationship with Teheran would be strictly economic, and would not extend into closer political or foreign policy cooperation. Moreover, Georgia claims that it has discussed its strategy for Iran with the United States, and thus no one should be surprised by this sudden outreach.

Yet, Saakashvili’s diplomacy seems very much out of step with the United States, having, endorsed the Turkish-Brazilian plan for reprocessing of Iranian nuclear fuel.

As can be clearly seen by the comparison of these two passages, the mention of the NSC source is omitted entirely. One can only surmise that apparently the mention of the NSC staff in such a sensitive context was deemed important enough to necessitate this redaction.

U.S. Defense Official's Remarks Regarding the New Missile Defense Architecture Raise Some False Hopes in Georgia

On Thursday, October 8, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia announced the dates of the visit by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Alexander Vershbow [Photo on the left courtesy of NATO]. Vershbow will be in Tbilisi on October 19-20. As I wrote already elsewhere, the U.S.-Georgian defense consultations, which will proceed during Vershbow's visit, will be conducted within the framework of the bi-lateral Security Working Group - one of the four working groups (others are on democracy, economic development and people-to-people relations) set up under the aegis of the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission, which, in turn, was founded earlier this year in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed on January 9, 2009. It should be noted that in late September Vershbow paid a working visit to Moscow, where, according to his September 30 interview with the Russian news agency Interfax, he was suppose to gauge Russia's "reaction to President Obama's [missile defense] decision and to determine whether Russia is interested in establishing a basis for cooperation on this." Vershbow's Interfax interview is compelling for a number of reasons some of which are cited below in the form of thematically arranged direct excerpts from the interview transcript:

Does the U.S. expect anything in return from Russia for Washington's changed stand on the missile defense issue?

Interfax: After revising its global missile defense plans, does the U.S. expect Russia to make reciprocal steps, including those regarding its stance on Iran’s nuclear program and the possible exports of S-300 air defense systems to Tehran?

Vershbow: The new approach which we have decided upon for missile defense was based on an analysis of the threats and of the available technologies, and was not presented as something on which we expected any quid pro quo. But the issue of the possible Russian transfer of the S-300 is a very critical issue in its own right, and we have said to Russia many times that we believe that that system could be very destabilizing in the region, and therefore have urged Russia to exercise restraint. So this is not something which we are negotiating on but simply something that we believe that Russia should see as in its own interest.

On Russia's concerns about the configuration of the Obama administration's new missile defense system:

Interfax: How would you comment on the concerns of some Russian experts that the new U.S. anti-missile system could be even more dangerous to Russia than the previous one, and if need be could Washington provide guarantee to Moscow that the U.S. missile defense program will not be targeted against Russia?

Vershbow: We look forward to further consultations with Russia to explain in greater detail than we have thus far the characteristics of the new system. Russia has already been briefed, primarily through the Russian ambassador in Washington who is a great expert in these matters. So we think Russia understands already the basic elements of the new architecture. But the whole rational for this new system is to deal with the threat from Iran, both the existing threats from short and medium range missiles, which are deployed today and already are capable of threatening not only Iran’s middleeastern neighbors but also some of our NATO allies in southeastern Europe. That’s what the first phases of the new system are focused on, providing immediate protection of our allies in the south east [of Europe]. But over time, to deal with future Iranian missiles which are already in the testing stage, and which will have longer range capacity to threaten allies in central Europe and northern Europe, the characteristics of the missiles which we are developing and the overall architecture, in our view, does not present any threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. And so far I think we have found some understanding from Russia in this regard. But still, it is a new system and we are fully prepared to engage in consultations with Russia to answer any questions and to explore possibilities for cooperation. Iranian ballistic missiles are a potential threat not just to NATO but to all countries within range of these systems, and cooperating on either a U.S.-Russia or a NATO-Russia basis would be a very valuable way to strengthen our common security.

On the possibility of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the missile defense area:

Interfax: In what particular areas can Russia and the U.S. cooperate on missile defense? Does Washington consider the possibility that the two countries could jointly operate the Russian radar station in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and its S-300 and S-400 air defense systems?

Vershbow: Secretary of Defense Gates and other senior defense officials have already pointed to the possibility of some form of link between Russian radars at Armavir, at Gabala, to provide additional data and early warning information that could benefit both of us in defending against ballistic missile threats. Exactly how these links would be established and how it would work technically is of course for the experts. But I think that the basic idea of sharing this kind of information against a common threat makes sense. And of course it could be just the beginning of a program of cooperation between NATO and Russia or between the United States and Russia on missile defense.

On the possibility of including the Caucasus in the new missile defense configuration:

Interfax: The U.S. missile shield plan reportedly envisions the deployment of some of its elements in the Caucasus. Could it be in Georgia, Azerbaijan, or some other state?

Vershbow: We are just at an early stage of designing this system and we are just beginning consultations with the allies in the southeast European region, as well as all our allies who could be part of the system in the long term. So, it’s really too early to comment on what countries might be participants in this system. I think that General O’Reilly, the head of our missile agency has emphasized that one of the keys to this system is to have an early warning radar relatively close to Iran, within a thousand kilometers of Iran, to provide an immediate detection of a launch, so that the rest of the system could do good work trying to intercept the missile before it hits its target.

Interfax: Could Georgia be part of it?

Vershbow: I really cannot say anything about specific countries. Right now we are consulting with our NATO allies. I can’t say anything more. Russian General Staff Chief Nikolai Makarov told that Russia had a negative attitude to the possible deployment of U.S. missile defense sites in the Caucasus. I think the important thing to remember is that we are talking about defending against the potential threat and potential attacks against our territory, our allies’ territory, and potentially Russian territory. I think that defensive strategies are inherently ones that bring countries together, countries that are facing a common threat. So that’s why we would hope that we can establish a basis for cooperation with Russia, so that everyone interested are protected.

On the American-Russian transit agreement for supplying U.S.-led coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan, which has not been implemented yet:

Interfax: When is the U.S. going to start using its right of military transit to Afghanistan through Russia?

Vershbow: I can’t give you an exact date (when the U.S. will start transit through Afghanistan) There are still some procedural issues that are not quite completed. I don’t think there are any differences between the countries, but there are some processes that have to run their course. We are hoping that these flights can begin very soon. The agreement in July was a very important commitment by Russia to contribute to the success of the NATO operation in Afghanistan. And putting that agreement to effect, I think, will not only be of practical value, but will be a strong signal to people of Afghanistan and to the surrounding region that the United States and Russia are working together to deal with a major challenge to international security.

On the recently published EU-sponsored report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (the so-called Tagliavini report):

Interfax: An independent international commission has determined that it was Georgia which started the war in the South Caucasus last August. Do you think these findings could affect the U.S.’ military cooperation with Georgia?

Vershbow: Washington is still studying this report, from what I have read only in the news it talks about the responsibility of both sides, but I think that it is really premature to draw any other conclusions before we have a chance to fully assess the report. We have always stood by Georgia’s sovereignty and independence and we will continue to support Georgia’s sovereignty and independence, and in the context of this report we should await the first comments of the [U.S.] State Department.

Vershbow's Caucasus comment probably gave the Georgian political expert and security analyst Gia Nodia the reason to tell the Armenian on-line news channel News.am on October 5 that the combination of the U.S. strategic interests in the region and threat of terrorism makes the establishment of the elements of the new missile defense system in Georgia likely. Nodia stated, "U.S. has an opportunity to use Georgia's territory, and its strategic interests quite allow them to do so." At the same time, on the official level, the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze avoided speculation when on the same day he stated that the U.S. has not addressed Georgia about the possibility of deployment of missile defense system in Georgia yet. While the latter, wait-and-see approach is obviously far more prudent under the circumstances, U.S. Secretary of Sate Hillary Clinton's remarks during her first recently concluded trip to Russia indeed provide a glimmer of hope that the U.S.-Georgian defense cooperation will not be bulldozed altogether by the priorities of the "reset" with Moscow. In her joint press conference with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 13, Secretary Clinton openly admitted that, when it comes to Georgia, the U.S. and Russia basically agree to disagree ("We will not see eye-to-eye on Georgia"). More importantly, in her interview with the opposition-minded radiostation Ekho Moskvy on October 14, Secretary Clinton simultaenously poured cold water on unrealistic missile defense expectations of some in Tbilisi while providing reassurances regarding the continuous defense assistance to Georgia. Here's the relevant excerpt from the interview transcript:

A. Venediktov: In this regard we understand the concern of Mr. Lavrov, and I would like to ask you directly - will the elements of the missile defense system be located on the territory of Georgia that causes disagreements between you?

H. Clinton: Yes, and I have no reason to believe at all that anything would be deployed in Georgia. No, I have no reason to believe that, and that is, I know, a matter of great concern to the Russian Federation. But again, that’s why we would like to work with – we would like to eliminate the concerns. We would like to have a joint missile defense program to protect our people, your people, our European friends and allies, to put as broad a missile defense system so that we can guard against short and medium-range missile that might have nuclear weapons.

A. Venediktov: Madame Secretary, did Mr. Lavrov rise the question of re-arming the Georgian army by your country and what did you respond to him?

H. Clinton: We talked about Georgia. Now we do have a difference there, and even though we are working hard to not just reset our relationship, but deepen our relationship, we will disagree about Georgia. Georgia is providing troops in Afghanistan. We are training Georgians to be able to go to Afghanistan. But we’re also making it very clear that we expect both the Georgians and the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians and everyone else to avoid provocative action, to deal with whatever problems they have through peaceful and diplomatic means.

A. Venediktov: But re-arming of and support to the Georgian army, Madame Secretary, concerns Russia a great deal.

H. Clinton: Minister Lavrov did not ask me that question, but we will help the Georgia people to feel like they can defend themselves.

A. Venediktov: This means that Minister Lavrov behaved himself like a gentleman. Usually he asks such questions. With you he behaved like a gentleman.

H. Clinton: Well, I think he knew the answer.

As officially announced, main topics of U.S.-Georgian defense consultations during Vershbow's visit to Tbilisi will focus on the Georgian defense reform, contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan and regional security issues. Undoubtedly speculations will proliferate about what all this will mean for Georgia's ability (or rather lack thereof) to defend itself and one suggestion that seems to be almost intuitive is that Tbilisi will certainly be better off if it suppresses its desire to boast success in this sensitive area, when none is to be noted.