The Cautionary Tale of Georgian Military Experience in Afghanistan

At the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers on Friday, December 4, and the so-called force generation conference held at the NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, on Monday, December 7, the Obama administration finally received the pledge of 7,000 additional troops from the NATO and non-NATO states to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for the stabilization of Afghanistan. This was almost immediately trumpeted by the Obama administration as a major achievement even though Canada and Netherlands are considering withdrawal of close to 5,000 of their combined troops from Afghanistan within the next two years while Germany and France both refused to provide additional troops at this point. Paris and Berlin may consider taking such steps only after the international conference scheduled for January 28 in London, which is supposed to review the progress of stabilization and state-building efforts in Afghanistan. In some sense, the Franco-German intransigence can be interpreted as a direct response to the prolonged deliberation by President Obama with regard to the formulation of the new strategy on Afghanistan. Be that as it may, it is worth noting that almost one seventh of the 7,000 pledge, or, to be more precise, 920 soldiers will be dispatched to Afghanistan by Georgia. The heavy battalion and two light companies of Georgian armed forces will serve under the U.S. Marine command in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan - the Helmand Province. As the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton observed, this is the highest per capita contribution to the NATO out-of-area operations in Afghanistan. It is intended to demonstrate that Georgia is a net security provider and can therefore one day become a valuable member of the alliance. However, as Georgia prepares to send its forces to Afghanistan to serve under the U.S. command, it would be instructive to recall the Georgian military experience in that country some three hundred years earlier, when the Georgian expeditionary force commanded by the King of Kartli Giorgi XI (see photo on the right courtesy of Wikipedia) was in the employ of the declining Safavid Empire. The following story is loosely based on the radio feature created by the Georgian writer and historian Mikha Gegeshidze and broadcast by the Georgian Service of the Voice of America. It is as timely as ever considering the current developments in Afghanistan.

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Once upon a time, a long time ago, where now the U.S. military have set up headquarters and the anti-terrorist campaign is under way, in the faraway city of Qandahar in Afghanistan, the King of Kartli, Giorgi XI held a court and governed local affairs. In the beginning of the XVIII century the weakened Iran was no longer able to deal with the continuous revolts by the rebellious Afghan tribes in the eastern provinces of the empire. Meanwhile in the separated by thousands of kilometers from Afghanistan Georgia, the kings of Kartli and Kakheti were engaged in the unequal struggle for independence from the same Persians. Because of this circumstance, the Shah’s Court in Isfahan hatched a treacherous plan to send Giorgi XI, who was known at the Court as Gurgin Khan or Gorgin Khan, from Georgia to Afghanistan to quell the unruly Pathan and Baluchi rebels. By dispatching the Georgian king and his troops renowned for their courage and martial valor, the increasingly corrupt and decadent administration of the Safavid ruler of Iran, Shah Soltan Hussein (alternative spelling: Soltan Hosayn), wanted to simultaneously diminish the threats of national liberation in Georgia and Afghanistan. With regard to this circumstance, the most loyal member of Giorgi XI retinue and the chronicler of his deeds, Sekhnia Chkheidze wrote:

“Thus, the Shah Soltan Hussein decreed to appoint King Giorgi to be spasalar [governor] of Kartli, Iran and Qandahar. What was to be derived from such a difficult task? Alas, with full intention to make the life in Kartli prosperous, we were unfortunately forced to leave for distant Qandahar with heavy hearts.”

In 1703, King Giorgi and his 24,000-strong combined Persian-Georgian troops entered Afghanistan and resolutely defeated the rebellious Pathan tribes. His forces captured the tribal chieftain of the Ghilzai rebels, Mirwais Khan Khottak, who was promptly sent to Isfahan. Giorgi XI sent a letter with the high-value prisoner in which he warned Shah Soltan Hussein that “this captive desires to sow mischief in Afghanistan and you’ll be better off if you never allow him to leave Isfahan, because otherwise he will turn against you again.” Giorgi XI also sent back to Isfahan the 20,000-strong Qizilbash forces and he was thus left with the small expeditionary detachment consisting only of Georgian cavalry. The Georgians were left to carry the heavy weight of the war with the Afghan tribes because the enemies of Giorgi XI in Isfahan convinced Shah Soltan Hussein to send Mirwais back to Afghanistan. Despite the tough weather conditions and the small number of troops, the Georgians confidently and bravely fought the Afghan rebels. Sekhnia Chkheidze, who himself was a skilled fighter, repeatedly notes in his chronicle that even in the midst of hardship Georgians often engaged in merrymaking to lift their morale and fighting spirit. This is what he has to say about Giorgi XI in this regard: “One of his peculiar habits was to become jolly when the matter at hand was often of the utmost importance and gravity. “

One of the Georgian commanders in Afghanistan, King's brother Prince Levan Batonishvili, recited the lines from Shota Rustaveli’s “Knight in the Panther’s Skin” to his troops before the battle. In the heat of the combat with the Baluchi fighters when the enemy bullets were whistling above Batonishvili’s head, Sekhnia Chkheidze pled with him to hide behind the horse to which Levan laughed and said that he was testing the fate. Encouraged by the bravery of their commanders, the Georgian cavalry troops were marching into the battle as if “by Almighty’s Grace, we were going to the wedding,” recalls Sekhnia Chkheidze. The tales of the exceptional martial valor of Georgians soon spread across the entire Afghanistan. This is how the citizens of the city of Kerman, who were long harassed and mistreated by the Pathans, expressed their gratitude to the Georgians: “Blessed be God for raising men like you, who saved us from peril.” Sekhnia Chkheidze describes with remarkable irony how the Georgian night guards applied creative intimidation techniques against their Pathan enemies the night before the battle:

“’God’s wrath is upon you! The Georgian Wali (Prince) Levan arrived with his man-eating Georgian troops!’ shouted the night guards and this caused a great anxiety among the Pathan ranks, but what they did not know was that we hardly had even twenty soldiers.”

The Persian troops, who were fighting together with the Georgians against the Pathan tribes, often exhibited fear and deserted the battlefield without looking back. Because of this circumstance the Georgians absorbed the entire viciousness of combat engagements in Afghanistan and they amply demonstrated feats of courage to their Pathan and Baluchi foes. Here is how Sekhnia Chkheidze describes one such encounter:

“Four Baluchi fighters rode off and the fifteen Persians rode after them. Then the four turned around and made the fifteen run back. When Zurab saw that, he went after the four. He struck one down with the spear and then the other. He struck the third Baluch so hard that, as sun shining above is the witness, the spear went straight through pinning him to the ground and it broke. Zurab then unleashed his sword against the fourth, who managed to get under his horse and tried to cut his stirrups with the dagger. But Zurab maneuvered his horse and when the Baluch’s head became visible he swung the sword and almost severed the head. The fifteen Persians then cut off the heads, congratulated Zurab and presented him with the four severed heads, but he declined to accept them and told them that he was simply assisting them.”

This case illustrates well the culture of knightly honor of the Georgian cavalrymen. The Georgians, noble and peasant alike, together experienced the vicissitudes of the deployment in Afghanistan, where they fought side by side. The cunning and treacherous supporters of Mirwais incurred the wrath of the Georgians, who resorted to the cruel punitive methods to quell the insurgency. Here is how Sekhnia Chkheidze describes some of the punitive methods employed:

“Wherever the signs of insurgency existed, the Georgian troops were dispatched in force and whomsoever they found among the rebels, some they threw into abyss and others were buried alive. Teeth were pulled out of some and hammered into their heads. The people of Qandahar became very afraid and they began to conspire against us.”

But Mirwais, who by then was defeated by Georgians on a number of occasions, in the end still managed to extract victory with his cunning. In 1709, he staged several rebellions in the villages close to Qandahar. Giorgi XI fell into this trap and sent 3,000-strong Georgian forces headed by his nephew Alexander to punish the rebels. Meanwhile Giorgi XI accepted the invitation by Mirwais to attend the lavish dinner in his honor. He went to the banquet with a small retinue of most loyal retainers. Here is what Sekhnia Chkheidze has to say about what happened next:

“The Sultan of Qandahar, Mirwais, betrayed the King Giorgi. At the dawn King Giorgi was suddenly attacked. He unsheathed his sword and managed to deflect most of the arrows that were raining on his tent. He fought like a beast, but was finally brought down by a rifle. And the rest of the Georgians were slaughtered without mercy.”

The enemies cited King Giorgi’s loyalty to Christianity as his biggest crime. As the Catholic missionaries in Iran note, and, according to Vakhushti Batonishvili, “the King was killed on Thursday and Mirwais discovered in King’s possession crosses, icons, and psalm books and presented them to Shah.” Mirwais sent 12,000-strong Pathan army against the remaining Georgian forces. “The Georgians fought them fiercely and they triumphed twelve times. The enemy lost 2,000 soldiers and, with Almighty’s Grace, the Georgians suffered no setbacks,” states the chronicle. After that, the Georgian military campaign in Afghanistan continued for some time and claimed the lives of many Georgian knights.

For their shameful betrayal of the Georgians fighting in Afghanistan, the Persians soon paid a very heavy price with their blood when the successors of Mirwais took over Isfahan and mercilessly exterminated the population of this once powerful imperial city. Among the Afghan warriors this proverb took deep roots - "Compared to Persians, we, Afghans, are lions, while Persians, compared to us, are mere sheep. But we are sheep, compared to Georgians, while Georgians are lions, compared to us."

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NOTA BENE: Not long after the assassination of Giorgi XI, in November of 1709, his nephew and a new King of Kartli Kaikhosro (alternative spellings: Kay Khusrau or Kai Khusraw) organized a punitive expedition to avenge the death of his uncle. He led the 30,000-strong Persian-Georgian army to lay siege to Qandahar, which did not last long as Kaikhosro's forces were constantly harassed by the Baluch fighters, who were trying to aid their besieged allies. In October 1711, Kaikhosro ordered the retreat, which turned into a disaster as the retreating troops were pursued by the Pathan forces. Kaikhosro was killed in battle and his entire army was reduced to 700 survivors.

Mirwais Khan Khottak properly assessed the decadence of the Safavids, but limited his actions to uniting the Pathan tribes and liberating Afghanistan from the foreign domination. His son, Mir Mahmud, who assumed power after the death of his father in 1715, however, turned out to be far more ambitious. The Afghan forces led by the 18-year-old Mahmud marched across Persia and struck into the very heart of the Safavid Empire - the city of Isfahan. Thus, in 1722, Mahmud effectively ended the Safavid rule once and for all. Ironically, Shah Soltan Hussein's failure to heed Giorgi XI's warning about the danger posed by Mirwais proved to be fatal as years later his son Mahmud spelled the demise of the entire Safavid Empire.

British Shadow Secretary of State for Defense Calls Russia a Threat

A week ago, on Tuesday, December 8, the Chatham House held the event "The Way Forward for NATO" featuring the British Shadow Secretary of State for Defense and Member of Parliament, Dr. Liam Fox (see photo on the right courtesy of www.liamfoxmp.co.uk), who delivered the speech on the future of the alliance. During the questions-and-answers session moderated by the Director of the Chatham House, Dr. Robin Niblett, Dr. Fox made a number of compelling remarks. Here are a couple of excerpts from the Q&A session, which can be streamed in its entirety (approximately half an hour) here:

On the geopolitical significance of globalization:

We do live in a very different global environment. I think that in many ways politicians have less grasp of globalization than the business community have. Politicians would like to talk about trade and prosperity, but they tend to focus much less on what is the unavoidable importation of strategic risk. If you have more widespread interests in more parts of the world, you are likely to be more threatened by more actors in more places. In many ways we are returning to a much more XIX century view of where we exist in the world rather than what may come to be seen as a blip of bipolarity of the XX century. And we'll have to re-learn some of the skills that we've had in dealing with that sort of global environment.


On Russia:

Tomas Valasek, Director of Foreign Policy and Defense at the Center for European Reform, who also advises Madeline Albright’s group of eminent personalities on the new NATO strategic concept, asked Dr. Liam Fox the following question:

Dr. Fox, thank you for your thoughtful remarks. One quick question on NATO-Russia. This is possibly the most divisive subject in the debates on the strategic concept so far. There are roughly three groups of allies if I might so stereotype them – those, who worry about Russia, particularly in Europe’s East and North and think of it as a possible future threat and want NATO to put in place preparations, contingency plans and exercises to prepare for the possibility; those, who do not think of Russia as a threat and think that concerns in Europe’s East and North are exaggerated; and those like Britain, if I might say so, and Canada, Denmark and others, who may be sympathetic to the concerns of those in Central Europe, but really think of Afghanistan as the right focus for NATO and possibly see in NATO paying more attention to Russia a distraction from NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Where would you stand on those issues? What sort of balance in your mind is required between the engagement of Russia and perhaps the reassurance of some of the allies against Russia and is reassurance indeed what NATO needs?

To which Fox responded:

I would add a fourth group, which is those, who really fear Russia, but pretend that they don’t, especially to Russia. They may be the biggest problem group that we have. I think Russia is a threat. Russia still targets weapons on us. Russia is still involved in the occupation of parts of Georgia. We’ve seen what happened in the Baltic States especially with the cyber attacks on Estonia. So let’s not pretend for a moment that Russia does not present us with the threat. It clearly does. But it also presents us with the opportunity. If we can find a way to deal with it in a constructive way, and I think what we need to do is to find language towards Russia, which is constructive, but strong and consistent. And I think the consistency is perhaps one of those things that we’ve lacked in our messaging and policy towards Russia in recent decades. So I think we have to find that. And I think…you know, in a rational world Russia would actually have a strong working relationship with the NATO alliance, with the West because we face many of the same problems of wider security, potential future threats of Islamist extremism Russia has on the southern border, of potential for nuclear proliferation, which we face in Iran, or wider issues of energy. But we do not live in a rational world and one of the problems in Russia is governance and the way Russia is governed and by whom makes a very big difference to Russia’s outlook. All we can try to do is to show Russia that we will be very strong in the defense of our borders, of those within our alliance, of our people and of our values, and ask them to work with us in areas where we have an overlap of common interests. And I think we need to go in without any preconditions, without overly optimistic views. And take a pragmatic and practical view to our relationships and establish confidence as far as we can along the way, but without fooling ourselves that we are entering some new golden era.

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NOTE: It appears that Dr. Fox's remarks caused some concern among unnamed Russian sources, as reported by the British website politics.co.uk.

A Chechen exile claims that Russia will intensify its efforts to fabricate the links tying Georgia to al Qaeda in the North Caucasus context

On October 13, 2009, during U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's first official visit to Russia, the Chairman of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) and the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Aleksandr Bortnikov (see the photo on the right courtesy of Kommersant) made the following remark during his speech at the NAC meeting:

"The audio reports discovered among the militants indicate that they jointly with the al Qaida emissaries have established contacts with the representatives of the Georgian special services, who participate in training and transfer of terrorists to the territory of the Chechen Republic.

In addition, they constantly carry out attempts to transfer weapons, explosives and funds for organizing sabotage operations at high-risk facilities of Dagestan, and, above all, at oil- and gas pipelines."

At first it seems this remark and its timing are not particularly surprising considering the well-established pattern of disinformation campaigns that the Kremlin periodically unleashes against Tbilisi to justify its bullying tactics against its impetuous southern neighbor. But the plot unexpectedly thickened when the once prominent Chechen exile in London, Akhmed Zakaev stepped into fray to provide some very interesting caveats. In the long and wide-ranging interview published in the popular Russian magazine Kommersant-Vlast No.42 (845) of October 26, 2009, among many interesting observations about his interactions with the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership, Zakaev noted the following:

Kommersant-Vlast Correspondent Musa Muradov: Why did the Sharia' court of Dokku Umarov sentence you to death?

Akhmed Zakaev: I was against the creation of the Caucasus Emirate. I wrote to Dokku that by declaring himself an Emir, he was going against the interests of the Chechen people.

Q: You are claiming that the Caucasus Emirate is the project of the special services. But Umarov's militants kill the Russian police officers and the special services operatives. Why would they create an enemy for themselves?

A: Since the announcement of the Caucasus Emirate, this war has turned into the war between the Caucasus people. In Chechnya Chechens are killed every day. In Ingushetia Ingushs. The local residents perish in Kabarda-Balkaria, Dagestan. The machine of self-destruction of the peoples of North Caucasus has been jump started.

Q: But during the special operations, I repeat, the FSB operatives die too.

A: Well they will be killed too. The Islamic militants, who fight in the North Caucasus, they are, of course, not the FSB agents. They are poisoned by the ideology, which they sincerely believe in and they believe that whatever they do now is exactly what is needed. And this is why they kill indiscriminately - police officers, FSB operatives and military personnel. The spiritual instructor of these duped boys has become Said Buriyatskiy, whose real last name is Tikhomirov. This person does not give a damn about the Chechens and their independence.

Putin stated that the Chechens fight not for the independence of the Chechen state, but for the creation of the Caliphate from sea to sea and you want us to allow them to carry on? We cannot allow them to do so! And this project has been in the works for some time. They have been working on it for a long time because earlier they wanted to transfer the national liberation movement into the sphere of struggle against the international terrorism. The project "Caucasus Emirate," and we can prove it, was developed at Lubyanka and was implemented by the FSB operatives. The project authors conceived that after its launch the struggle of the Chechen people for its freedom and independence would be presented as the struggle against the unbelievers. And Russia would transform from the aggressor that committed war crimes on the territory of Chechnya to the victim of the global jihad. And everyone sympathizing with or supporting the legitimate demands of the Chechen people would be equated with the accomplices of the Islamic extremists. According to our information, in the foreseeable future the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing to present to the United Nations Security Council the request regarding the recognition of the Caucasus Emirate as part of the al Qaeda, which will be complete with materials indicating the cooperation between the Georgian special services and the representatives of Dokku Umarov and the Caucasus Emirate. And the recent statement by the head of the FSB of Russia Bortnikov that there is al Qaeda in Georgia and that they [the Georgians] are helping to transport terrorists to the territory of Chechnya is precisely the kind of prelude to what they [the Russians] are preparing.

U.S. Defense Official's Remarks Regarding the New Missile Defense Architecture Raise Some False Hopes in Georgia

On Thursday, October 8, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia announced the dates of the visit by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Alexander Vershbow [Photo on the left courtesy of NATO]. Vershbow will be in Tbilisi on October 19-20. As I wrote already elsewhere, the U.S.-Georgian defense consultations, which will proceed during Vershbow's visit, will be conducted within the framework of the bi-lateral Security Working Group - one of the four working groups (others are on democracy, economic development and people-to-people relations) set up under the aegis of the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission, which, in turn, was founded earlier this year in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed on January 9, 2009. It should be noted that in late September Vershbow paid a working visit to Moscow, where, according to his September 30 interview with the Russian news agency Interfax, he was suppose to gauge Russia's "reaction to President Obama's [missile defense] decision and to determine whether Russia is interested in establishing a basis for cooperation on this." Vershbow's Interfax interview is compelling for a number of reasons some of which are cited below in the form of thematically arranged direct excerpts from the interview transcript:

Does the U.S. expect anything in return from Russia for Washington's changed stand on the missile defense issue?

Interfax: After revising its global missile defense plans, does the U.S. expect Russia to make reciprocal steps, including those regarding its stance on Iran’s nuclear program and the possible exports of S-300 air defense systems to Tehran?

Vershbow: The new approach which we have decided upon for missile defense was based on an analysis of the threats and of the available technologies, and was not presented as something on which we expected any quid pro quo. But the issue of the possible Russian transfer of the S-300 is a very critical issue in its own right, and we have said to Russia many times that we believe that that system could be very destabilizing in the region, and therefore have urged Russia to exercise restraint. So this is not something which we are negotiating on but simply something that we believe that Russia should see as in its own interest.

On Russia's concerns about the configuration of the Obama administration's new missile defense system:

Interfax: How would you comment on the concerns of some Russian experts that the new U.S. anti-missile system could be even more dangerous to Russia than the previous one, and if need be could Washington provide guarantee to Moscow that the U.S. missile defense program will not be targeted against Russia?

Vershbow: We look forward to further consultations with Russia to explain in greater detail than we have thus far the characteristics of the new system. Russia has already been briefed, primarily through the Russian ambassador in Washington who is a great expert in these matters. So we think Russia understands already the basic elements of the new architecture. But the whole rational for this new system is to deal with the threat from Iran, both the existing threats from short and medium range missiles, which are deployed today and already are capable of threatening not only Iran’s middleeastern neighbors but also some of our NATO allies in southeastern Europe. That’s what the first phases of the new system are focused on, providing immediate protection of our allies in the south east [of Europe]. But over time, to deal with future Iranian missiles which are already in the testing stage, and which will have longer range capacity to threaten allies in central Europe and northern Europe, the characteristics of the missiles which we are developing and the overall architecture, in our view, does not present any threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. And so far I think we have found some understanding from Russia in this regard. But still, it is a new system and we are fully prepared to engage in consultations with Russia to answer any questions and to explore possibilities for cooperation. Iranian ballistic missiles are a potential threat not just to NATO but to all countries within range of these systems, and cooperating on either a U.S.-Russia or a NATO-Russia basis would be a very valuable way to strengthen our common security.

On the possibility of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the missile defense area:

Interfax: In what particular areas can Russia and the U.S. cooperate on missile defense? Does Washington consider the possibility that the two countries could jointly operate the Russian radar station in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and its S-300 and S-400 air defense systems?

Vershbow: Secretary of Defense Gates and other senior defense officials have already pointed to the possibility of some form of link between Russian radars at Armavir, at Gabala, to provide additional data and early warning information that could benefit both of us in defending against ballistic missile threats. Exactly how these links would be established and how it would work technically is of course for the experts. But I think that the basic idea of sharing this kind of information against a common threat makes sense. And of course it could be just the beginning of a program of cooperation between NATO and Russia or between the United States and Russia on missile defense.

On the possibility of including the Caucasus in the new missile defense configuration:

Interfax: The U.S. missile shield plan reportedly envisions the deployment of some of its elements in the Caucasus. Could it be in Georgia, Azerbaijan, or some other state?

Vershbow: We are just at an early stage of designing this system and we are just beginning consultations with the allies in the southeast European region, as well as all our allies who could be part of the system in the long term. So, it’s really too early to comment on what countries might be participants in this system. I think that General O’Reilly, the head of our missile agency has emphasized that one of the keys to this system is to have an early warning radar relatively close to Iran, within a thousand kilometers of Iran, to provide an immediate detection of a launch, so that the rest of the system could do good work trying to intercept the missile before it hits its target.

Interfax: Could Georgia be part of it?

Vershbow: I really cannot say anything about specific countries. Right now we are consulting with our NATO allies. I can’t say anything more. Russian General Staff Chief Nikolai Makarov told that Russia had a negative attitude to the possible deployment of U.S. missile defense sites in the Caucasus. I think the important thing to remember is that we are talking about defending against the potential threat and potential attacks against our territory, our allies’ territory, and potentially Russian territory. I think that defensive strategies are inherently ones that bring countries together, countries that are facing a common threat. So that’s why we would hope that we can establish a basis for cooperation with Russia, so that everyone interested are protected.

On the American-Russian transit agreement for supplying U.S.-led coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan, which has not been implemented yet:

Interfax: When is the U.S. going to start using its right of military transit to Afghanistan through Russia?

Vershbow: I can’t give you an exact date (when the U.S. will start transit through Afghanistan) There are still some procedural issues that are not quite completed. I don’t think there are any differences between the countries, but there are some processes that have to run their course. We are hoping that these flights can begin very soon. The agreement in July was a very important commitment by Russia to contribute to the success of the NATO operation in Afghanistan. And putting that agreement to effect, I think, will not only be of practical value, but will be a strong signal to people of Afghanistan and to the surrounding region that the United States and Russia are working together to deal with a major challenge to international security.

On the recently published EU-sponsored report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (the so-called Tagliavini report):

Interfax: An independent international commission has determined that it was Georgia which started the war in the South Caucasus last August. Do you think these findings could affect the U.S.’ military cooperation with Georgia?

Vershbow: Washington is still studying this report, from what I have read only in the news it talks about the responsibility of both sides, but I think that it is really premature to draw any other conclusions before we have a chance to fully assess the report. We have always stood by Georgia’s sovereignty and independence and we will continue to support Georgia’s sovereignty and independence, and in the context of this report we should await the first comments of the [U.S.] State Department.

Vershbow's Caucasus comment probably gave the Georgian political expert and security analyst Gia Nodia the reason to tell the Armenian on-line news channel News.am on October 5 that the combination of the U.S. strategic interests in the region and threat of terrorism makes the establishment of the elements of the new missile defense system in Georgia likely. Nodia stated, "U.S. has an opportunity to use Georgia's territory, and its strategic interests quite allow them to do so." At the same time, on the official level, the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze avoided speculation when on the same day he stated that the U.S. has not addressed Georgia about the possibility of deployment of missile defense system in Georgia yet. While the latter, wait-and-see approach is obviously far more prudent under the circumstances, U.S. Secretary of Sate Hillary Clinton's remarks during her first recently concluded trip to Russia indeed provide a glimmer of hope that the U.S.-Georgian defense cooperation will not be bulldozed altogether by the priorities of the "reset" with Moscow. In her joint press conference with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 13, Secretary Clinton openly admitted that, when it comes to Georgia, the U.S. and Russia basically agree to disagree ("We will not see eye-to-eye on Georgia"). More importantly, in her interview with the opposition-minded radiostation Ekho Moskvy on October 14, Secretary Clinton simultaenously poured cold water on unrealistic missile defense expectations of some in Tbilisi while providing reassurances regarding the continuous defense assistance to Georgia. Here's the relevant excerpt from the interview transcript:

A. Venediktov: In this regard we understand the concern of Mr. Lavrov, and I would like to ask you directly - will the elements of the missile defense system be located on the territory of Georgia that causes disagreements between you?

H. Clinton: Yes, and I have no reason to believe at all that anything would be deployed in Georgia. No, I have no reason to believe that, and that is, I know, a matter of great concern to the Russian Federation. But again, that’s why we would like to work with – we would like to eliminate the concerns. We would like to have a joint missile defense program to protect our people, your people, our European friends and allies, to put as broad a missile defense system so that we can guard against short and medium-range missile that might have nuclear weapons.

A. Venediktov: Madame Secretary, did Mr. Lavrov rise the question of re-arming the Georgian army by your country and what did you respond to him?

H. Clinton: We talked about Georgia. Now we do have a difference there, and even though we are working hard to not just reset our relationship, but deepen our relationship, we will disagree about Georgia. Georgia is providing troops in Afghanistan. We are training Georgians to be able to go to Afghanistan. But we’re also making it very clear that we expect both the Georgians and the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians and everyone else to avoid provocative action, to deal with whatever problems they have through peaceful and diplomatic means.

A. Venediktov: But re-arming of and support to the Georgian army, Madame Secretary, concerns Russia a great deal.

H. Clinton: Minister Lavrov did not ask me that question, but we will help the Georgia people to feel like they can defend themselves.

A. Venediktov: This means that Minister Lavrov behaved himself like a gentleman. Usually he asks such questions. With you he behaved like a gentleman.

H. Clinton: Well, I think he knew the answer.

As officially announced, main topics of U.S.-Georgian defense consultations during Vershbow's visit to Tbilisi will focus on the Georgian defense reform, contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan and regional security issues. Undoubtedly speculations will proliferate about what all this will mean for Georgia's ability (or rather lack thereof) to defend itself and one suggestion that seems to be almost intuitive is that Tbilisi will certainly be better off if it suppresses its desire to boast success in this sensitive area, when none is to be noted.

French Foreign Minister's Interesting Interview with Ekho Moskvy

On Thursday, October 1, 2009, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner gave a wide-ranging interview to the radio host and astute observer Aleksei Venediktov from Russia's only remaining opposition-minded radio station Ekho Moskvy. [See photo on the left. Courtesy of Natalia Zhukova, Radio Ekho Moskvy.] It should be noted that the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kushner and French Defense Minister Herve Morin were in Moscow last week to meet with their Russian counterparts in the 2+2 format. As it turns out, the meeting agenda included the discussions regarding the possibility of Russia's purchase of the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier. What follows is the verbatim English translation of the excerpts from the interview transcript posted on the website of the Ekho Moskvy:

On the Russia-Georgia war of 2008:

A. Venediktov: You mentioned sanctions. A year ago, when there was a war between Russia and Georgia, you also spoke of possible sanctions. At the time you did not exclude the possibility of sanctions against Russia. I am asking you the question now. Has your position to this war and its consequences in Russia and Georgia changed, Mr. Minister?

B. Kushner: Well, hold on...You constantly...

A. Venediktov: Indeed it was you, who spoke of sanctions!

B. Kushner: No, I speak of peace. I said three times: 'Peace, peace, peace!' Chances are...when the confrontation is approaching and then there are very few means to...[inaudible] that confrontation. That's the possibility of war. And we do not want it.

A. Venediktov: Nonetheless, the European Council issued the report on the war between Russia and Georgia. Our radio listeners are asking, you personally, Mr. Kushner, who was one of the actors in the creation of the post-war system...

B. Kushner: I am a professional actor.

A. Venediktov: I agree. Tell me, please, do you think the situation between Russia and Georgia is a dead end? Everything is frozen and will remain as is.

B. Kushner: I hope not. By the way, the French, European Union does everything in order to avoid the dead end. So I am returning to your first question. There is a report, but I do not have it with me. I am very careful in my phrases here because I need to familiarize myself with the details of that report. From what I read though, in the report it is written that Mr. Saakashvili started the war in Tskhinvali on the night of August 8. Almost immediately I, as you know, and President Sarkozy arrived in Moscow and then met in Georgia.

It was August 10 and the Russian troops were approaching Tbilisi. I did not see it myself, what the devastation was in Tskhinvali. Then I saw that there were bombings at night, there was a night bombing. We cannot claim that. And without a doubt these hostilities led to [inaudible]. After that there were many provocations from both sides. Between these two populations, who used to reside together. It is a valley and only about 200 meters separate the neighbors. And mountains are within about 3 kilometers. It is a very small distance. Between the South Ossetia and the towns of Georgia, which are nearby, within several kilometers.

The tanks were already in Gori, where the great Stalin was born. Still I find it somewhat strange. The separation. Stalin drew that map in such a manner so as to avoid a confrontation. Thus, there were mutliple provocations, they began to bomb the city, then the troops showed up. I think we need to condemn both. And the problem of borders in Europe should not be resolved by the use of force. I think not just in Europe but in the whole world. We shall study this report very carefully. I do not know if this was a lack of success, failure. But I think France at the time presided over the European Union and it undertook diplomatic efforts.

That is why now I come here and will be discussing issues with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs and the president. There were changes in the French diplomacy. Can we consider that we achieved some success? I do not know. We slowed down the possible consequences. I think there were chances that the Russians could go to Tbilisi. I do not know whether or not this problem is solved. But in the end there are negotiations under way in Geneva. It is important that they continue. These are very important meetings. Everyone is meeting in Geneva. I hope that the solution will be found in the end. Since then we have not recognized either Ossetia or Abkhazia. Only two countries did - Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Please, consider the influence of this decision.

A.Venediktov: Mr. Minister, do you think the Russian side thoroughly fulfilled the Sarkozy-Medvedev plan?

B. Kushner: No, no, no.

A. Venediktov: What's left?

B. Kushner: In particular, the European observers, who were in the zone and with whom we talked and told that every detail was important. From my point of view, I think it is important to start and to calm things down somehow, I understand that the borders are not suitable for Russia and I know under what conditions they were drawn. That was the moment when Gorbachev and Yeltsin were in power. That was not my fault. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of Communists, that was not our fault. Already back then the situation was not so great. At some point this needs to be resolved. Let's start with keeping there the European observers, there are three hundred of them there. We managed to gather them in fifteen days and they represent all countries of Europe. These observers should be on the both sides of the border because it is necessary.

And in particular, in Ossetia. And you know the distance there is literally within two steps. We do not want to provoke the war. This is the force of peace and monitoring.

A. Venediktov: Mr. Minister, some of your compatriots and your Georgian compatriots talk about the fact that when it comes to issues related to Georgia, Sarkozy resembles Daladier and that this is the new Munich of 1938, when France surrendered Georgia as at the time Daladier surrendered Czechoslovakia. How do you like this comparison?

B. Kushner: Well, you know, if we talk about Munich, well...I think this was invoked many times before about the similar situations. No, I remember, I recall very clearly. I was not born then, but Munich was a completely different situation. And England and France backed away under the pressure of Nazism. Of course, that's not at all what we have here. After all, I want to emphasize here that the Americans were nowhere to be seen. It is convenient to dispense advice that it is important to display strength and courage from afar. But we did it with own hands with President Sarkozy to end the war.

And in this regard Russia participated, fulfilled the agreement, which we signed on paper here, in Moscow and then later in Tbilisi. After that Ms. Condoleezza Rice, who was still the foreign minister then, as you know, wrote the letter saying that this was absolutely unsatisfactory. The Russian troops occupied territories, which were not theirs and they stayed on those territories. I will tell you the following. I am proud that I went to the North Ossetia and that I visited refugees there. Nobody wanted me to go there and I was told I had no right and everyone wanted to force me not to go there, both Russians and Georgians.

And then I met with the refugees. I spent 2-3 hours with them. And these poor people were desperate, there were, of course, casualties, they were in the utter despair. There were refugees on the other side as well. But this is not a unilateral decision. We cannot resolve this on our continent with war.

On the possibility of selling the Mistral-class amphibious helicopter carrier to Russia:

A. Venediktov: Lately there is much talk about the military-technical cooperation between France and Russia. In particular, the French military are interested in the helicopter carrier Mistral. Does the French government support Russia in its willingness to buy the French equipment and in particular Mistral?

B. Kushner: You are right. It's good that you mentioned the military-technical cooperation. This is also a political cooperation. We meet with the defense and foreign affairs ministers sometimes in Paris and sometimes in Moscow. You understand that we trust each other. By the way, Mr. Medvedev will meet us today. In particular, the negotiations are technical. Mistral is a great vessel, very functional. There is a certain political procedure involved here and it is important for that procedure to be fulfilled. It is important to fulfill it in order to achieve a political agreement. If this political agreement is reached, since I do not decide, but I think that there is a representative from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who deals with that, then I hope you will be able to acquire this wonderful Mistral.

What I want to say is that France wants to develop the European defense policy. But at the same time we would like to have a certain area, a zone of joint defense, joint security...

A. Venediktov: Without the U.S.A?

B. Kushner: No. No. Of course, U.S.A. could be there as well, but Medvedev's proposal is as follows. He spoke of the zone of European security, I think he spoke of it in Kaliningrad. We said: 'Yes.' But where are the proposals? Thus far they are being discussed in diplomatic circles, after the conference at the OSCE, precisely at the OSCE. Of course, that's the only organization, where there are Americans, Europeans and Russians. And we ought to talk through this organization. We are ready to talk about it. We want to see the zone of the European countries plus Balkans and if they want to join, I welcome it.

And there will be another zone with our Russian friends, which will be the zone of security.

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Instant commentariat:

Regardless of how bad (or good) was the quality of the simultaneous French-to-Russian interpreter, who was attending the interview, it is still possible to draw some raw observations regarding specific points raised above:

• The French Foreign Minister displays a remarkable lack of knowledge of the most basic facts about the conflict in South Ossetia.
• He admits that the there was a possibility that the Russians could have entered Tbilisi.
• He is still bitter about the fact that Americans showed no leadership throughout the hottest phase of the confrontation last August.
• He still considers himself a great humanitarian for participating in photo ops with the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from South Ossetia in Georgia and refugees in North Ossetia.
  
• He carelessly acknowledges that the Russo-French negotiations over the Mistral deal are advanced (see "technical" above) and by "a certain political procedure" he most likely means the inconvenient requirement to obtain the green light from Washington since nothing that contains U.S.-manufactured defense-related component (and Mistral undoubtedly contains quite a few of those) can be sold to or patented out to another country without an approval, which is likely to be a very time-consuming endeavor.
• He vaguely outlines possible tenets of French view on European defense policy, which apparently entails an area of joint defense and/or security with Russia.